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This Article re-conceptualizes the idea of transitional justice
mechanisms as varying approaches meant solely to address the legacy
of abuse in one nation, and proposes that transitional justice
mechanisms can also encompass regional and transnational efforts to
respond to mass human rights violations occurring across societies. This
Article focuses on the challenges posed by trials and truth seeking
mechanisms in conflicts where massive human rights violations have
occurred across nations and argues that where these mechanisms have
been established without regard to the regional or transnational nature
of human rights violations, such mechanisms will encounter problems
of coordination including legal primacy, information sharing, and
access to detainees. This Article analyzes these critical issues by
examining the transitional justice mechanisms in Liberia and Sierra
Leone and highlights the challenges posed by the failure to take a
regional approach. The Article proposes that adopting a regional
approach when designing transitional justice mechanisms in the
aftermath of mass atrocity across societies is the best means for
achieving long-term peace, stability, and respect for human rights
within the affected region.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Special Court for Sierra Leone has a responsibility
to Liberia to promote justice, to ensure that Taylor has a
fair trial, and to ensure that justice is done to him and
justice is done to Liberia. And, in doing justice to Liberia
the Truth & Reconciliation Commission (TRC) should
have access to Taylor if the TRC so desires, and Taylor
should have access to the TRC if he also so desires.  1
Massive human rights violations are often not limited to one state
but affect other states. Post-conflict transitional justice mechanisms are
usually set up to address legacies of abuse in one nation, but this does
not necessarily reflect the reality of some conflicts and the
interconnectedness of some conflicts. The Special Court for Sierra
Leone’s (SCSL) prosecution of former Liberian President Charles
Taylor for his alleged role in the conflict in Sierra Leone poses a
number of challenges. The Truth & Reconciliation Commission for
Liberia (TRC-L) was created to investigate the legacy of gross
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2. Int’l Ctr. for Transitional Justice, What is Transitional Justice?, http://www.ictj.org/en/tj/
(last visited Apr. 4, 2009); see also Luc Huyse, Justice After Transition: On the Choices Successor
Elites Make in Dealing With the Past, 20 LAW & SOC. INQ. 1 (1995); David Little, A Different Kind
of Justice: Dealing With Human Rights Violations in Transitional Societies, 13 ETHICS & INT.
AFFAIRS 65 (1999); TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES (James
McAdams ed., 1997); see generally NEIL J. KRITZ, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING
DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES (U.S. Institute of Peace 1995) (collecting in three
volumes materials on transitional justice, including scholarly commentary, country studies, and
primary sources). 
3. Truth seeking mechanisms investigate violations of human rights, whether the
investigations are conducted via official national inquiries such as truth commissions or via
international commissions of inquiry or NGO efforts.
4. GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL
JUSTICE 247 (2000). 
violations of human rights abuses, to ensure accountability, as well as,
to promote reconciliation in Liberia. Significantly, no explicit provision
in the Act creating the TRC-L addressed exactly what the relationship
would be between the TRC-L and the SCSL. 
Liberia and Sierra Leone, like other societies pursing accountability
for mass atrocities and human rights abuses, have chosen to employ
transitional justice mechanisms. The International Center for
Transitional Justice (ICTJ) defines transitional justice as a term that
“refers to a range of approaches that societies undertake to reckon with
legacies of widespread or systematic human rights abuse as they move
from a period of violent conflict or oppression towards peace,
democracy, the rule of law, and respect for individual and collective
rights.”  As a field, transitional justice focuses on a number of2
approaches to confronting the past, including trials and truth-seeking
mechanisms.  This Article focuses on the challenges posed by trials and3
truth seeking mechanisms in conflicts where massive human rights
violations have occurred across nations. It argues that post-conflict
trials and truth commissions can not be formulated along national lines
where the conflicts cross them and massive human rights violations
have occurred across nations. This Article’s central premise is that it is
a fundamental mistake to establish national institutions for regional or
transnational abuses, or to utilize international institutions, which fail to
consider this. 
Proponents of trials after massive human rights violations argue
that, “prosecution is the only real means of retribution.  Additionally,4
the familiar refrain that “there is no durable peace without justice” is
based on the assumptions that trials, “build up a sturdy peace by, first,
purging threatening . . . leaders; second, deterring war criminals; third,
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5. GARY BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS
286 (2000). 
6. Id. at 286 – 304 (for a further discussion of the weaknesses of these arguments).
7. See generally E. Gyimah-Boadi, Executive Director, CDD-Ghana, Paper Presentation at
the British Hall Council: Reconciliation: Comparative Perspectives, 5 (June 13, 2005) (on file with
author) (The author drafted this lecture while interning at CDD-Ghana). 
8. MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS FACING HISTORY AFTER
GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 5 (1998). 
9. Id. at 123. 
10. See Aryeh Neier, Emilo Mignone Lecture on behalf of the International Center for
Transitional Justice at New York University School of Law, 6 (Oct. 15, 2008).
11. See PRISCILLA HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS FACING THE CHALLENGE OF TRUTH
rehabilitating . . . countries; fourth, placing the blame for atrocities on
individuals rather than on whole . . . groups; and fifth, establishing the
truth about wartime atrocities.”  Despite these claims, it is far from5
clear whether trials have all of these desired effects in the short or long
term.  In particular, trials can never establish a thorough historical6
record as they focus on individual cases, and not the complex
relationships that exist between individuals, groups, and institutions that
make massive human rights violations possible. Indeed, trials are not
aimed at determining the “truth,” but rather, whether a particular
criminal standard of proof has been meet based on the charges before
the court. There are also procedural and operational limitations to using
trials particularly in post- conflict situations.  Notwithstanding these7
limitations, this author believes that trials create some sense of
accountability, justice, and establishing the rule of law. As Martha
Minow, Professor of Law at Harvard, whose research focuses on human
rights in transitional societies, aptly put it, while “legal responses are
inevitably frail and insufficient [,] . . . inaction by legal institutions
means that the perpetrators prevailed in paralyzing the instruments of
justice.”  Indeed, “guilty verdicts afford public acknowledgment of8
what happened, and its utter wrongfulness.”  They are a way of9
conveying that “a society is not willing to overlook the suffering
inflicted on the victims of grave abuses nor turn a blind eye to the
cruelties committed by those with the highest responsibility for causing
that suffering.” 10
It is partly because of the limitations of trials, that some countries
have turned to truth seeking mechanisms as a way to respond to past
atrocities. A “truth commission” is the general designation used to
describe an official organ organized for a limited time and for the
specific purpose of examining serious human rights violations that
occurred in the past.  The notion of a “truth commission” began in11
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COMMISSIONS 14 (2002).
12. Id. at 5 (noting that none of the other commissions up to that point had held hearings in
public or offered individualized amnesty). 
13. MINOW, supra note 8, at 88. 
14. Gyimah-Boadi, supra note 7, at 7. 
15. See id. at 8. 
16. MINOW, supra note 8, at 89. 
Argentina, although the most familiar body is the South African Truth
and Reconciliation Commission.  Truth commissions can have a12
number of goals attached to them including, to
Overcome communal and official denial of the atrocity and gain
public acknowledgment; obtain the facts in an account as full as
possible in order to meet victims’ need to know, to build a
record for history, and to ensure minimal accountability and
visibility of perpetrators; end and prevent violence . . . forge the
basis for a domestic democratic order that respects and enforces
human rights; . . . promote reconciliation across social
divisions; promote psychological healing for individuals,
groups, victims, bystanders, and offenders; [and] restore dignity
to victims . . . 13
It is similarly ambiguous whether truth commissions actually
achieve these goals in the short or long term. Additionally, due to
funding, and time constraints, truth commissions are highly limited in
investigations, statement taking, and transcribing information.  As14
such, the commission’s report and its ability to deliver the “truth” will
often be inadequate. Furthermore, while truth commissions can possibly
contribute to the respect for human rights and democratization, these
initiatives are inevitably plagued with problems of implementation of
their recommendations.  Despite the numerous limitations of truth15
commissions, this author believes that truth commissions can have an
independent value in that they emphasize the experiences of those
victimized, the development of a comprehensive historical record, and
the reform of societies after mass atrocity. 
Trials and truth seeking mechanisms serve different functions and
fulfill different roles. Truth commissions focus on restorative justice,
while trials focus on retributive justice. As Professor Minow explains,
“all of the practical dimensions of prosecutions could work against the
goals of healing, reconciliation, and full truth-telling.”  Indeed, truth16
commissions are not judicial bodies and do “not presume to try people
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17. Id. at 87. 
18. HAYNER, supra note 11, at 87.
19. Id. at 90, 102. 
20. Id. at 102. “The Spanish judge, who brought charges against Augusto Pinochet, relied
heavily on the Chilean truth commission report.” Id. Similarly, human rights groups attempting to
bring charges against the former ruler of Chad, Hissein Habre, began their efforts by examining the
truth commission’s report in Chad. Id. 
21. The majority of the scholarship in this area has focused on the concurrent operation of
transitional justice mechanisms within the same country and context. For example, in East Timor
a truth commission and trials coincided. See generally Piers Pigou, Int’l Ctr. For Transitional
Justice, Crying Without Tears: In Pursuit of Justice and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste: Community
Perspectives and Expectations, Occasional Paper Series, Aug. 2003. The bulk of the literature has
focused on the concurrent operations of the SCSL and the TRC-SL; William A. Schabas, Truth
Commissions and Courts Working in Parallel: The Sierra Leone Experience, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L
L. PROC. 189 (2004); HUMAN RTS. WATCH, POLICY PAPER ON THE INTER-RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE SIERRA LEONE SPECIAL COURT AND THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (2002),
available at www.hrw.org; Solomon Berewa, Addressing Impunity Using Divergent Approaches:
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court, in TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
IN SIERRA LEONE: A COMPILATION OF ARTICLES ON THE SIERRA LEONE TRUTH AND
or establish guilt and innocence.”  Priscilla Hayner, Director of the17
Peace and Justice Program for the ICTJ maintains, “nonjudicial truth
bodies do not and should not be seen to replace judicial action against
perpetrators . . . . While their subject matters may overlap in that they
both investigate past crimes, trials and commissions serve different
purposes, and neither can fill the role of the other.”  Often times after18
mass atrocity, “truth” is juxtaposed in opposition to “justice,” but in fact
many truth commissions have forwarded their case files to prosecuting
authorities and have recommended prosecution.  Indeed, there is no19
inherent reason why truth commissions cannot contribute to later trials,
or must be seen in opposition to justice.  This Article does not assume20
that one approach to transitional justice is inherently better than the
other given the limitations of both trials and truth commissions. Indeed,
different conflicts require different approaches to transitional justice.
Ultimately, this author believes that whatever transitional justice
approach adopted should be guided by the desires of those most
affected by the conflict(s) and the abuses, human rights victims.
However, difficult legal questions arise where trials and truth
commissions operate concurrently, namely around legal primacy,
information sharing, and access to detainees. The way these issues are
resolved can have a considerable impact on the effectiveness of both
institutions. 
While some practitioners and scholars have written articles on the
relationship between truth commissions and courts,  nothing has been21
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RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (UNAMSIL, Freetown, 2001); INT’L CRISIS GROUP, THE SPECIAL
COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE PROMISES AND PITFALLS OF A ‘NEW MODEL, AFRICA BRIEFING NO. 16
AUG. 2003.
22. Elizabeth M. Evenson, Truth and Justice in Sierra Leone: Coordination Between
Commission and Court, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 730, 758 (2004).
23. Id. at 760-1.
24. A regional conflict complex is a term used to describe contemporary armed conflicts,
which are more transnational than “civil.” See Peter Wallensteen & Margareta Sollenberg, Armed
Conflict and Regional Conflict Complexes, 5 J. PEACE RESEARCH 35, 621-34 (1998). 
written about the concurrent operation of these bodies to address related
events in different countries. Elizabeth M. Evenson, a human rights
lawyer, has recommended a loose framework for making coordinating
decisions between the truth commissions and trials operating in the
same country.  Evenson concluded that “where institutions are created22
simultaneously . . . coordination can be explicitly written into the
statutes of each” and where the establishment of one institution is
“subsequent to the establishment of another, the legislation of the later
in time institutions should be drafted clearly to outline and resolve
potential areas of conflict.”  23
An even more compelling argument can be made for situations
where massive human rights violations are not limited to one state, but
affect other states. While Evenson’s work presents an important
contribution to the literature on coordination between truth
commissions and trials, her framework fails to consider regional or
transnational approaches. Evenson’s framework is indicative of the
largely parochial focus of transitional justice scholars. It is almost as if
transitional justice processes take place completely divorced from one
another in a vacuum. This Article distinguishes itself from previous
scholarship because it argues that where massive human rights
violations have occurred across nations, transitional justice mechanisms
cannot simply be “coordinated,” rather these institutions must be
designed to reflect the reality of conflict lines. 
In order to test this hypothesis, this Article will focus on the case of
Liberia and Sierra Leone. The conflicts that occurred in Sierra Leone
and Liberia are intimately related. In fact, they formed a “regional
conflict complex.”  The interactions between the conflicts suggest that24
where transitional justice mechanisms have been established without
regard to the regional or transnational nature of massive human rights
violations, such mechanisms will encounter problems of coordination.
Liberia opted to use a truth seeking mechanism, the TRC-L, and Sierra
Leone utilized a combination of a truth seeking mechanism, the Truth &
Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone (TRC-SL), and criminal
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25. During a research trip to Sierra Leone in July of 2005 with support from the Fulbright
Fellowship, I conducted interviews with personnel at the SCSL, the TRC-SL and relevant civil
society groups for my thesis, National Reconciliation and Transitional Justice Processes in West
Africa: A Comparative Study of Sierra Leone and Ghana (Oct. 4, 2005) (unpublished M.A.
dissertation, University of Ghana Legon Centre for International Affairs) (on file with author). I
also went on a research trip to Liberia in January 2007 with support from the Streicker Student
Fund at Yale Law School, and conducted interviews with personnel from the TRC-L and civil
society groups. See Appendix I for list of interviewees. More recently, I conducted assessment
missions on a separate project for the ICTJ in late 2008 and early 2009 in Sierra Leone, Liberia,
and Ghana focusing on truth telling, prosecutions, and reparations. I interviewed over one hundred
human rights victims, relevant actors from truth commissions, courts, government agencies, and
civil society groups amongst others. The information gathered from the missions in Liberia and
Sierra Leone also informs this Article. Interviewees expressed varying degrees of comfort with
being quoted directly, as such; citations are generally not attributed to specific individuals. See
Matiangai Sirleaf, Transitional Justice in West Africa: A Comparative Assessment of Transitional
Justice Experiences in Ghana, Sierra Leone and Liberia, app. Int’l Ctr. for Transitional Justice
(forthcoming publication 2009) (for full list of interviews).
trials through the SCSL. This Article analyzes the most critical issues
posed by the failure to take a regional approach in Sierra Leone and
Liberia. For example, whether the SCSL or the TRC-L holds legal
primacy is unclear. Additionally, it is uncertain whether information
that the TRC-L collects will be shared with the SCSL, or whether the
TRC-L’s power to grant confidentiality to sources could protect it from
requests or subpoenas from the SCSL. Another crucial question is
whether the SCSL will grant the TRC-L access to Taylor for the
purpose of completing its own investigations and establishing a
complete record of the human rights violations that occurred in Liberia.
I use interviews conducted with individuals involved with the
transitional justice mechanisms in both Sierra Leone and Liberia to
explore these issues.  25
The case of Liberia and Sierra Leone will demonstrate the
importance of an integrated approach to transitional justice in regional
conflicts. In short, this Article re-conceptualizes the idea of transitional
justice mechanisms as varying approaches meant solely to address the
legacy of abuse in one nation, and proposes that transitional justice
mechanisms can also encompass regional and transnational efforts to
respond to mass human rights violations occurring across societies. Part
I of this Article has introduced the problem, and analyzed the different
roles and purposes of trials and truth commissions. Part II summarizes
the interconnectedness of the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Part
III examines the creation and mandates of the transitional justice
mechanisms in Sierra Leone, and in Liberia. 
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26. See generally CENTER FOR INT’L COOPERATION, POLICY APPROACHES TO REGIONAL
CONFLICT FORMATIONS, CONFERENCE SUMMARY OF NY MEETING 5-7 (2002), available at http://
www.cic.nyu.edu/archive/pdf/FINAL2.pdf. 
27. This Article will not go into detail about the well documented ways in which both civil
wars were financed through “conflict diamonds” and the arms trafficking that occurred between
Liberia and Sierra Leone. See generally PAUL COLLIER & ANKE HOEFFLER, GREED AND GRIEVANCE
IN CIVIL WAR, (World Bank, 2001); PAUL COLLIER & ANKE HOEFFLER, JUSTICE SEEKING AND
LOOT-SEEKING IN CIVIL WAR, (World Bank, 1999); DAN SMITH & RACHEL STOHL, CTR. FOR DEF.
INFO., PRESENTATION AT THE FAILED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CONFERENCE, SMALL
ARMS IN FAILED STATES: A DEADLY COMBINATION (1999), available at http://www.cdi.org/issues/
failedstates/march99.html; BRIAN WOOD & JOHAN PELEMAN, THE ARMS FIXERS: CONTROLLING
THE BROKERS AND SHIPPING AGENTS BASIC RESEARCH REPORT NO. 99 (PRIO), available at
Part IV explores the troubled relationship of the SCSL and the TRC-
SL, focusing on the three key challenges: legal primacy, information
sharing, and access to detainees. Part IV also examines the problems
posed by failing to take a regional approach when designing the SCSL
and TRC-L regarding the aforementioned issues, focusing specifically
on the case of Taylor before the SCSL. Part V proposes that a “regional
approach” in designing transitional justice mechanisms would be
superior for addressing situations where massive violations have
occurred across borders. Finally, Part VI concludes that a regional
approach to transitional justice in the aftermath of mass atrocity across




In order to fully grasp the interelatedness of the transitional justice
processes in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, it is necessary to briefly
discuss the interconnectedness of the conflicts. This Article begins with
the understanding that the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone were
part of a “regional conflict complex.” Regional conflicts are formed
through a number of factors including: regional states competition in a
weak or collapsed third state; competition for access to extra-regional
resources; state collapse in one or more states; the existence of a
parallel transnational informal economy; trans-border social networks;
the availability and “lootability” of natural resources; militarization and
arms trafficking in the region; as well as the existence of trans-border
armed groups.  This Part focuses on a number of these factors to26
demonstrate the regional nature of the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra
Leone.  To assert that the conflicts were regional in nature does not27
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http://www.nisat.org/publications/armsfixers/Chapter1.html.
28. In Sierra Leone more than 50,000 people were killed, while in Liberia over 250,000
people were estimated to have died during the civil war. 
29. ABIODUN ALAO ET AL., PEACEKEEPERS, POLITICIANS, AND WARLORDS: THE LIBERIAN
PEACE PROCESS 20 (U.N. University Press, 1999).
30. Robert Mortimer, From ECOMOG to ECOMOGII, in AFRICA IN WORLD POLITICS: THE
AFRICAN STATE SYSTEM IN FLUX. 191 (John Haberson & Donald Rothchild eds., Westview Press
2000).
31. POLITY IV, COUNTRY REPORT 2000: LIBERIA (2001), available at http://www.bsos.umd.
edu/cidcm/inscr/polity/Lbr1.htm. 
32. See generally FESTUS ABOAGYE, ECOMOG: A SUB-REGIONAL EXPERIENCE IN CONFLICT
RESOLUTION MANAGEMENT AND PEACEKEEPING IN LIBERIA, (1999).
33. Mortimer, supra note 30, at 189.
34. ERIC BERMAN, REARMAMENT IN SIERRA LEONE: ONE YEAR AFTER THE LOMÉ PEACE
AGREEMENT 3 (2000). 
35. INT’L CRISIS GROUP, AFRICA REPORTS NO. 43, LIBERIA THE KEY TO ENDING REGIONAL
ignore the unique and individualized reasons that lead to conflicts in
each country. Rather, recognizing the interconnectedness of the
conflicts suggests that a regional or transnational approach should have
been adopted in designing the transitional justice mechanisms.
The conflicts in Liberia and in Sierra Leone were tragedies of
immense proportions, resulting in nearly 300,000 deaths, and creating
millions of refugees and internally displaced people.  In December28
1989, a band of rebels known as the National Patriotic Front of Liberia
(NPFL), led by Charles Taylor invaded northern Liberia.  The stated29
goal of Taylor’s NPFL was overthrowing the corrupt regime of
President Samuel Doe, who gained power through a coup in 1980 that
overthrew the elected President William Tolbert Jr. Sierra Leone’s
conflict began in 1991, when Former Army Corporal Foday Sankoh and
his Revolutionary United Front (RUF) invaded Sierra Leone from
Liberia with the assistance of Taylor’s NPFL. The RUF incursion led to
the breakdown of state authority in Sierra Leone, destabilizing the
regime of President Momoh.  For all practical purposes, Liberia30
became a failed state as warlords throughout the country competed for
political power and economic resources.  31
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
brokered a cease-fire in Liberia in 1990, which was to be implemented
by the Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).  The Momoh regime32
in Sierra Leone took a prominent role in ECOMOG, hosting their first
meeting in July 1990.  “Taylor wanted to weaken ECOMOG, which he33
(correctly) believed to be blocking his attempts to take control of the
capital” of Liberia.  Taylor vowed that Sierra Leone would soon “taste34
the bitterness of war.”  The International Crisis Group reports that out35
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INSTABILITY 2 (2002).
36. Id. 
37. Interview with Gibril Foday-Musa, Former RUF combatant, in Freetown, Sierra Leone
(Dec. 2002).
38. See, e.g., U.N. Sec. Council, Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 1343 Concerning Liberia, ¶ , at 26, U.N. Doc. S/2001/1015 (Oct. 26, 2001) [hereinafter
U.N. Panel of Experts-Liberia Report], available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/
Liberia2/1015e.pdf (discussing the porous nature of the borders between Liberia, Sierra Leone, and
Guinea causing Liberia to close its borders with Sierra Leone and Guinea in mid-March 2001).
39. See Christopher Clapham, Sierra Leone: the Global-Local Politics of State Collapse and
Attempted Reconstruction, in FAILED STATES CONFERENCE REPORT 9 (2001), available at
http://www.comm.ucsb.edu/research/mstohl/failed_states/2001/papers/CLAPHAM2.pdf.
40. U.N. Sec. Council, Report of the Panel of Experts Appointed Pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 1306, in Relation to Sierra Leone, ¶ 192, at 33, U.N. Doc. S/2000/1195 (Dec.
20, 2000) [hereinafter U.N. Panel of Experts-SL Report]. 
41. See ALAO ET AL., supra note 29, at 90.
42. Id. 
43. See Election Watch, 8 J. OF DEM., 4 Oct. 1997, available at http://muse.jhu.edu/
journals/journal_of_democracy/election_watch/v008/index.html (discussing Taylor’s 75.3% victory
in 1997). 
of the 100 fighters of the RUF that invaded Sierra Leone initially,
almost 50 of them were Liberian and Burkinabe mercenaries.  Gibril36
Foday-Musa, a former RUF combatant and part of the initial group,
confirms, “they were merely fulfilling an initial agreement that we will
help you fight and then you create a base for us and then we can
attack.”  After the onset of Taylor’s NPFL insurgency in Liberia, the37
RUF were also able to receive regular training in NPFL held territories,
which was made possible by the porous borders between the two
countries.  Christopher Clapham, Professor of Politics and38
International Relations at Lancaster University in the United Kingdom,
who has written extensively on security dilemmas in African states,
asserts that Sankoh’s connections with Charles Taylor might well have
been instrumental in enabling him to emerge as the head of the RUF. 39
There is extensive documentation on the level of support the RUF
received from Taylor’s NPFL through the provision of training,
weapons, and a safe haven amongst others.  40
With pressure from ECOMOG, the warring parties in Liberia signed
the Abuja II Accord in August 1996.  Despite the serious challenges41
that had derailed the preceding peace agreements, the Abuja II Accord’s
implementation resulted in the disarmament of about 23,000
combatants.  On July 19, 1997, Charles Taylor won the Liberian42
elections with a convincing 75% majority.  Many Liberians were afraid43
of the consequences of a disillusioned Taylor “returning to the bush” if
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44. A popular campaign slogan expressed many Liberians rationale, “He killed my Pa, He
killed my Ma, I’ll vote for him.” See Douglas Farah, Standing by as a Brutal Warlord Plots His
Return, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2005/09/30/AR2005093002085.html (discussing how Taylor’s support was based
on fear). 
45. Mortimer, supra note 30, at 191.
46. Regional forces (ECOMOG II), led by Nigerian troops, which withdrew in April 2000,
a 17,500 strong U.N. peacekeeping contingent sent to the country in November 1999, and a small
contingent of British troops that entered Sierra Leone in May 2000, provided a modicum of
stability. 
47. U.N. Panel of Experts-SL Report, supra note 40, ¶ 183, at 33.
48. U.N. Panel of Experts-Liberia Report, supra note 38, ¶ 115, at 28. 
49. Taylor admitted his support of Liberia’s affiliation with the RUF in 2002, and announced
that he had closed down the RUF liaison office in Monrovia, as well as its bank account. Tiawan
Gongole, The Liberian Government Finally Admits Support to RUF, PERSPECTIVE, Nov. 27, 2002,
at 2, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/liberia/2002/1202taylor.htm.
50. SURVIVORS’ RIGHTS INT’L, SRI BACKGROUND ALERT: LIBERIA (2003), available at
http://www.survivorsrightsinternational.org/ms_word_files/liberiabackgrounden.org.
he felt isolated from the peace process.  Meanwhile in Sierra Leone, as44
a result of the conflict, several coups took place, eventually leading to
wartime elections that brought Ahmed Tejan Kabbah to office in March
1996.  Disgruntled soldiers led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma, leader45
of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, and affiliated with the
RUF, overthrew Kabbah in May 1997. The arrival of peacekeepers and
internal resistance in Sierra Leone enabled President Kabbah to return
to power in February 1998.  46
Even after Taylor’s election, as President of Liberia, RUF
combatants trained alongside Liberia’s special governmental forces,
dubbed the “Anti-Terrorist Unit,” and Taylor frequently used RUF
combatants for his own personal security details.  The RUF-Liberian47
relationship was “also strategic for [the] RUF. . . . Liberia offer[ed]
sanctuary and a location to store weapons and keep armed units active
and trained . . .”  Certainly, the role that Liberia played as a safe haven48
for the RUF was vital to the insurgents’ survival and ability to continue
to foment war in Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone’s conflict was a battle
between successive civilian and military governments, in alliance with
the government-aligned Civil Defense Force against the RUF. After
several unsuccessful peace accords, the government and the RUF signed
the Lomé Peace Agreement in July 1999. However, even this agreement
faced severe problems of implementation.
Due to Taylor’s support for the RUF,  both Sierra Leone and49
Guinea supported dissident refugee populations within their borders to
unseat Taylor from power.  Notably, some of the members of the rebel50
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51. SURVIVORS’ RIGHTS INT’L, SRI COUNTRY BRIEFING: LIBERIA 22 (2003), available at
http://www.survivorsrightsinternational.org/pdfs/Liberia_report.pdf.
52. Côte d’Ivoire supported this group in Liberia because of Taylor’s support for two rebel
groups in Côte d’Ivoire composed mostly of ex-RUF and Liberian soldiers. See Lansana Gberie,
Diamonds Without Maps: Liberia, the UN, Sanctions and the Kimberly Process, P’ship Afr. Can.
Occ. Paper 11, 5, June 2004.
53. Sierra Leone Ends State of Emergency, BBC NEWS, Mar. 2, 2002, at 32, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid_1850000/1850735.stm. See also Ofeibea
Quist-Arcton, Sierra Leone: Kabbah is Declared Victor and Sworn in for New Term, ALL AFRICA
COM, May 20, 2002, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200205200001.html.
54. See Ofeibea Quist-Arcton, West Africa: Taylor Confirms He Will Step Down in Liberia
August 11, ALL AFRICA COM Aug. 2, 2003, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200308020064.
html.
group, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy, fought for
Kabbah’s government in Sierra Leone against the RUF before fighting
to remove Taylor from power.  The fighting led by Liberians United51
for Reconciliation and Democracy and its splinter group, the Movement
for Democracy in Liberia,  continued intermittently in Liberia. On52
January 18, 2002, President Kabbah officially declared Sierra Leone’s
conflict over and lifted the four-year state of emergency, ahead of the
general elections in May 2002, which he convincingly won.  The53
intensity of Liberia’s conflict heightened during 2002, forcing Taylor to
declare a state of emergency and engage in peace negotiations with the
rebel groups. Taylor eventually stepped down from power in August of
2003.  Shortly thereafter, the interim government and rebel groups54
signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Ghana, and the United
Nations launched a massive peacekeeping mission to Liberia. This brief
synopsis provides some insight into the regional nature of the conflicts.
While the regional conflict complex affected Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea,
this Article does not examine these countries, since transitional justice
mechanisms were not established or operating at the time of writing. In
Sierra Leone and Liberia, three distinct transitional justice mechanisms,
with separate and overlapping mandates, were created. 
III. JUSTICE IN SIERRA LEONE & TRUTH IN LIBERIA?
In order to understand fully the challenges posed by the failure to
adopt a regional approach in Liberia and Sierra Leone, it is necessary to
analyze the respective and overlapping mandates of the transitional
justice mechanisms created. This Part examines the factors that
influenced Liberia and Sierra Leone’s approaches to transitional justice,
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55. Lomé Accord art. IX (3), Sierra Leone - RUF, July 7, 1999 [hereinafter Lomé Peace
Agreement], available at http://www.sierra-leone.orglomeaccord.html. 
56. See Berewa, supra note 21, at 55.
57. The statement by the U.N. SRSG does not appear in the actual text of the Agreement as
it was published by the United Nations (U.N. Doc. S/1999/777). The TRC-SL was given a copy of
the agreement to which the statement was appended in handwriting. See TRUTH & RECONCILIATION
COMMISSION, WITNESS TO TRUTH: REPORT OF THE SIERRA LEONE TRUTH & RECONCILIATION
COMMISSION, [hereinafter TRC-SL REPORT], vol. 3B, ch. 6, 364 (2004), available at http://www.
trcsierraleone.org/pdf/start.html. 
58. See Lomé Peace Agreement, supra note 55, art. XXVI.  
discussing briefly key provisions in their respective peace agreements.
Additionally, it discusses the creation of the transitional justice
mechanisms in both Sierra Leone and Liberia, highlighting important
sections of their enabling documents. 
A. Establishment of the TRC-SL and the SCSL
The creation of the TRC-SL and the SCSL proceeded in a haphazard
manner in Sierra Leone. Initially, the Lomé Peace Agreement signed in
1999, granted blanket amnesty to all the fighters.  The common belief55
was that the RUF would not sign the agreement if there were any
prospect of legal action against its members.  At the time of signing,56
the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United
Nations appended a disclaimer, 
The United Nations holds the understanding that the
amnesty provisions of the Agreement shall not apply to
international crimes of genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of
international humanitarian law.  57
This reservation apparently meant that the “full amnesty” granted to all
fighters was in fact not so full. Article XXVI of the Lomé Peace
Agreement made provision for creating the TRC-SL, 
[T]o address impunity, break the cycle of violence,
provide a forum for both the victims and perpetrators of
human rights violations to tell their story . . . in order to
facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation . . . This
Commission shall, among other things, recommend
measures to be taken for the rehabilitation of victims of
human rights violations. 58
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59. The Truth and Reconciliation Act of 2000, Feb. 22, 2000 [hereinafter TRC-SL Act],
available at http://www.usip.org/library/tc/doc/charters/tc_sierra_leone_02102000.html.
60. Id. art. 6(2). 
61. Id. art. 7(1).
62. Paul Allen, Criminal Trials and Truth Commissions in Period of Transitions: A Case
Study of the Operational Relationship between the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation
Commission and the Special Court (Nov. 30, 2004) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Central European
University) (on file with author). 
63. TRC-SL REPORT, supra note 57, vol. 3B, ch. 6, 366 (citing Letter from Alhaji Dr. Ahmad
Tejan Kabbah, President of Sierra Leone to Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations
(June 12, 2000)). 
The blanket amnesty that the warring parties granted themselves in the
Lomé Peace Agreement concomitant with the creation of the TRC-SL
makes it clear that the warring parties envisioned the truth-telling
process to be an alternative mechanism to trials.
Sierra Leone’s Parliament passed The Truth and Reconciliation Act
on February 22, 2000.  The functions of the TRC-SL as outlined in59
Article 6 (2) of the Act include:
[I]nvestigate and report on the causes, nature and
extent of the violations and abuses . . . to the fullest
degree possible, including their antecedents, the context
in which the violations and abuses occurred . . . whether
those violations and abuses were the result of deliberate
planning, policy or authorization by any government,
group or individual; 60
In order to carry out these functions, the TRC-SL was to undertake
research and investigations, hold hearings, and take individual
statements.  In mid-2000, the implementation of the Lomé Peace61
Agreement was threatened when RUF fighters confronted U.N.
peacekeepers and took 500 of them hostage.  With the RUF fighters’62
action, the political landscape changed dramatically, as President
Kabbah sent a letter to petition the Secretary General requesting a
Special Court: 
[T]o try and bring to credible justice those members
of the [RUF] and their accomplices responsible for
committing crimes against the people of Sierra Leone
and for the taking of [U.N.] peacekeepers as hostages.63
224 FLORIDA JOU RNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 21
64. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special
Court for Sierra Leone, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (Oct. 4 2000). 
65. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the
Establishment of a Special Court For Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone-U.N., art. 1, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178
U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter SCSL Agreement], available at http://www.specialcourt.org/documents/
Agreement.htm.
66. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 10, Jan. 16, 2002 (referring, under
articles 2-4, to crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international
humanitarian law), available at http://www.specialcourt.org/documents/SpecialCourtStatute
Final.pdf.
67. See infra discussion Part IV (A)(1). 
68. See Patricia M. Wald, International Criminal Courts – A Stormy Adolescence, 46 VA. J.
INT’L L. 319, 337-39 (2006) (discussing how hybrid tribunals “represent one powerful model
through which national and international legal systems are communicating and influencing one
another.”); see also Jenia I. Turner, Nationalizing International Criminal Law, 41 STAN. J. INT’L
L. 1, 37- 38 (2005) (discussing the ability of hybrid bodies to engage with local populations and
raise awareness in a way that international tribunals cannot).
69. See Mark E. Wojcik et al., International Legal Developments in Review: 2004 Disputes,
39 INT’L LAW. 279, 291 (2005). In this respect, the SCSL differs from both the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
(ICTY), which were both created under Security Council Resolutions. Id. 
The Secretary General’s report called for the establishment of a
court by a treaty between the United Nations and Sierra Leone.  The64
agreement between the United Nations and Sierra Leone stipulated that
the SCSL was to “prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility
for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra
Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30
November 1996.”  The Statute of the SCSL actually went further,65
stating plainly, “an amnesty granted to any person falling within the
jurisdiction of the Special Court in respect of the crimes referred to in
Articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute shall not be a bar to prosecution.”66
By agreeing to the Statute, the Government effectively repudiated the
amnesty provided in the Lomé Peace Agreement. The creation of the
SCSL also left uncertain the status of the TRC-SL, before this body had
even began effectively operating.  67
The Statute of the SCSL indicates that the court is a hybrid body that
uses both international and Sierra Leonean law.  It lacks enforcement68
powers that would enable it to compel other States to cooperate in the
investigation of crimes and the apprehension of suspects.  In addition,69
“the jurisdiction of the Court is limited to the territory of Sierra Leone,
meaning that even if it had the power to compel extradition, it could not
consider cases arising from events taking place outside the country,
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70. Chandra L. Sriram, Wrong Sizing International Justice? The Hybrid Tribunal in Sierra
Leone, 29 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 472, 482 (2006) (footnotes omitted).
71. Both the ICTY and the ICTR the first international tribunals created are located in The
Hague, Netherlands and Arusha, Tanzania respectively. See generally Turner, supra note 68
(discussing the limitations of international tribunals located outside of the relevant society). The
SCSL is distinct from the Serious Crimes Unit and Special Panel for Serious Crimes, in East Timor,
which processes perpetrators of offences through the domestic criminal justice system. See
generally Pigou, supra note 21. 
72. See James Cockayne, The Fraying Shoestring: Rethinking Hybrid War Crimes Tribunals,
28 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 616, 639-40 (2005) (discussing the date of the Abidjan Accord as an
arbitrary distinction between those who will be punished and those who will not because many
serious violations occurred before this date); see also Allen, supra note 62, at 484 (discussing how
this date implied that only fighting in Freetown mattered).
73. See THIERRY CRUVELLIER, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST., THE SPECIAL COURT
FOR SIERRA LEONE: THE FIRST EIGHTEEN MONTHS 11 (2004), available at http://www.ictj.org/
images/content/1/0/104.pdf. 
74. See id. 
75. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Office for Legal Affairs
of the United Nations organized an expert meeting on the Relationship Between the TRC-SL and
the SCSL in New York on Dec. 20-21, 2001. See TRC-SL REPORT, supra note 57, vol. 3b, ch. 6,
at 374. 
even if they involved atrocities related to the conflict.”  The SCSL is70
the first international tribunal to sit in the country where the war crimes
took place.  The SCSL has a temporal jurisdiction, which limits its71
mandate to events occurring after November 30, 1996, although the
conflict began in 1991.  72
The SCSL and the TRC-SL were to fulfill different roles in Sierra
Leone regarding transitional justice. Initially, scholars and practitioners
thought that they could fulfill complementary roles. The Court would
try (and convict) only the key perpetrators, while the TRC-SL would
provide a more complete record of the conflict.  Additionally, scholars73
and practitioners expected criminal trials to contribute to the promotion
of individual accountability, while the TRC-SL would fulfill an equally
important role in making positive recommendations for legal, political,
and administrative reform.  74
In December 2001, the United Nations assembled a Group of
Experts to discuss and propose recommendations that would guide the
relationship between the TRC-SL and the SCSL.  The Group75
recommended that, “[t]he modalities of cooperation should be
institutionalised in an agreement between the TRC and the Special
Court and, where appropriate, also in their respective rules of
procedure. They should respect fully the independence of the two
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76. Id. (citing U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/2002/3, ¶ 70) (discussing the guiding principles agreed
upon by the Expert Group). 
77. Id. at 375. 
78. Peace Agreement between the Government of Liberia, The Liberians United for
Reconciliation and Democracy, The Movement for Democracy in Liberia and the Political Parties
art. XIII, Aug. 18, 2003 [hereinafter Comprehensive Peace Agreement], available at http://www.
reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/MHII-62F8J6?OpenDocument. 
79. Id. pmbl. 
80. Id. art. XIII. 
81. Id. art. XXXIV. The Transitional Government “shall give consideration to a
recommendation for general amnesty to all persons and parties engaged or involved in military
activities during the Liberian civil conflict that is the subject of this Agreement.” Id. 
82. See supra discussion at Part III (A). 
institutions and their respective mandates.”  Neither institution heeded76
this advice. The TRC-SL, in its Final Report noted, “the two institutions
themselves . . . might have given more consideration to an arrangement
or memorandum of understanding to regulate their relationship.”  77
B. Establishment of TRC-L
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement called for the creation of the
TRC-L, 
[T]o provide a forum that will address issues of
impunity, as well as an opportunity, for both the victims
and perpetrators of human rights violations to share their
experiences, in order . . . [to] deal with the root causes of
the crises in Liberia, including human rights violations
. . . [and] among other things, recommend measures to be
taken for the rehabilitation of victims of human rights
violations.  78
The negotiations surrounding the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
took place at the height of the Liberian conflict in 2003.  79 The parties
made a conscious decision during the talks to privilege a truth
commission over trials. 80 In addition, the language of the agreement left
the possibility of amnesty open,  but unlike Sierra Leone, amnesty was81
not granted to any of the parties.  Paul Allen, who is a Program82
Associate in ICTJ’s field office in Liberia, stated, “people who
negotiated the peace were the very people,” who “were going to be
targeted” if there were prosecutions, “so one would understand why
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83. Interview with Paul Allen, Consultant, Int’l Center for Transitional Justice, in Monrovia,
Liberia (Jan. 12, 2007).
84. Interview with Ezekiel Pajibo, Former Executive Director, Center for Democratic
Empowerment in Monrovia, Liberia (Jan. 9, 2007). 
85. An Act to Establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of Liberia, Nat’l
Transitional Legislative Assembly, May 12, 2005 [hereinafter TRC-L Act]. The author served as
a legal intern during the summer of 2006 with the TRC-L. The confidentiality clause of the TRC-L
Act § 41(a) states, “. . . every member of the staff of the Commission shall, with regard to any
matter dealt with by him or her, or information which comes to his or her knowledge in the
exercise, performance or carrying out of his or her powers, functions or duties” must “preserve and
assist in the preservation of those matters which are confidential in terms of the provision of this
Act or which have been declared confidential by the Commission.” Id. at art. IX, § 41(a). The
author has not disclosed any confidential information gained from interning at the TRC-L. All of
the information referenced in this Article was gathered from public documents or from the author’s
field research. 
86. Id. art. IV, § 4(a).
87. Id. art. VII § 26(i).
88. Id. art. VII § 26(e).
they” opted for a truth commission.  Indeed, warring parties dominated83
the negotiations, although there was some participation from the
international community and Liberian civil society. Ezekiel Pajibo, a
Liberian human rights activist, who was involved in the discussions to
create a truth commission in Liberia, asserted that based on the, “kinds
of atrocities in this country, the best transitional mechanism would have
been a war crimes tribunal, but given the context under which we were
operating we knew that would not be feasible.”  84
The National Transitional Legislative Assembly passed the TRC-L
Act in May 2005 and formally approved its provisions on June 10,
2005.  The TRC-L Act mandates the Commission to investigate gross85
human rights violations, violations of international humanitarian law,
and abuses that occurred in Liberia from January 1979 to October 14,
2003.  In addition, the TRC-L is mandated to create, “an independent,86
accurate and objective record of the past and make recommendations
reflective of the truth to re-unify and reconcile contending groups
and/or the peoples of Liberia.”  87
The TRC-L functions and powers include “[g]athering information
and receiving evidence from any person or persons . . . through the
taking of statements and through evidence gathered through the conduct
of both public and confidential hearings upon request of witnesses,
informants, petitioners . . . subject to the exclusive discretion and
authority of the TRC.”  While the TRC-L’s powers include the88
standard “truth-telling” functions, the Act also includes some retributive
elements. For example, the TRC-L powers include 
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89. Id. art. VII, § 26(b)-(d). 
90. Id. art. VII, § 26(j)(iv).
91. Id. art. VII, § 26(g).
b. Identifying where possible persons, authorities,
institutions and organizations involved in the violations; 
c. Determining whether such violations were the result of
deliberate planning on the part of the state, authority, or
political organization, movement or group of individuals;
and 
d. Ensuring accountability, political or otherwise, for any
such violation.  89
Significantly, the TRC-L is empowered to make recommendations for
prosecution in “particular cases[,] as [it] deems appropriate.”  In90
addition, the TRC-L’s Act also includes an ambiguous amnesty clause,
which empowers the Commission to recommend, 
amnesty under terms and conditions established by the
TRC upon application of individual persons making full
disclosures of their wrongs and thereby expressing
remorse for their acts and/or omissions, whether as an
accomplice or a perpetrator, provided that amnesty or
exoneration shall not apply to violations of international
humanitarian law and crimes against humanity in
conformity with international laws and standards. 91
The effect of the amnesty provision is unclear because the TRC-L is
primarily investigating violations of international humanitarian law and
crimes against humanity. 
The TRC-L’s Act was passed after the SCSL’s Statute, and does not
address potential areas of conflict with the SCSL. The drafters of the
Act may not have envisioned any relationship with the SCSL, or
perhaps they deemed it unnecessary to include in the Act. In fact, the
establishment of all three transitional justice mechanisms in Liberia and
Sierra Leone were done without regard to the regional nature of human
rights violations. This Article argues that this failure in the institutions’
designs will be readily apparent given the concurrent operation of the
TRC-L and the SCSL. The following Part provides an in-depth analysis
of the central challenges posed by the failure to take a regional
approach.
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92. SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 37 (2005), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?
fileticket=pmp4ckQZ098%3d&tabid=176 (listing persons indicted by the Special Court for Sierra
Leone from the RUF – Charles Taylor, Foday Sankoh, Issa Sesay, Sam Bockarie (Maskita), Morris
Kallon and Augustine Gbao; from the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council - Johnny Paul Koroma,
Alex Tamba Brima, Ibrahim “Bazzy” Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu; and from the Civilian
Defense Forces - Chief Sam Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana and Alieu Kondewa).
93. Id. (stating that Johnny Paul Koroma is currently “at large”). See also David M. Crane,
White Man’s Justice: Applying International Justice After Regional Third World Conflicts, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 1683, 1685 (2006) (discussing Foday Sankoh’s death by natural causes while in
custody of the SCSL and the alleged murder of Sam Bockarie by Taylor).
94. See J. Peter Pham, A Viable Model for International Criminal Justice: The Special Court
for Sierra Leone 19 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 37, 96-97 (2006); see also Cockayne, supra note 72, at 642
(explaining that many Sierra Leoneans believed Norman and the CDF saved the country). 
95. See Kathy Ward, Might v. Right: Charles Taylor and the Sierra Leone Special Court, 11
NO. 1 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 8, 9 (2003). 
96. See id. (discussing the ICTY’s indictment of Slobodan Milosevic for war crimes as the
first of a sitting Head of State). Taylor’s trial marked the first of an African Head of State. See
Jennifer Easterday, Charles Taylor Trial Report (December 1, 2008 to February 28, 2009), 3 (U.C.
Berkeley War Crimes Studies Center, Sierra Leone Trial Monitoring Program), available at
IV. CENTRAL CHALLENGES POSED BY THE FAILURE TO TAKE A
REGIONAL APPROACH TO TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN
SIERRA LEONE & LIBERIA 
The concurrent operation of the SCSL and the TRC-SL has
tremendous relevance for the operations of the SCSL and the TRC-L.
At the outset, the relationship between the SCSL and the TRC-SL was
cordial; however, the two transitional justice mechanisms were soon to
find themselves at loggerheads. This Part examines the retrospective
challenges of coordination faced by the TRC-SL and the SCSL, and the
prospective challenges for the SCSL and the TRC-L. Before launching
into a detailed discussion of the challenges posed, the following
paragraphs provide a brief overview of the operations of the SCSL and
the TRC-L to date. 
The SCSL’s first indictments and arrests targeted top commanders
of armed groups. By September 2003, the Court had indicted thirteen
individuals in leadership positions.  Of those indicted, nine are92
currently in the Court’s custody.  The indictment of the prominent93
Deputy Defense Minister and National Commander of the Civilian
Defense Force, Chief Samuel Hinga Norman, was unexpected and was
a surprise to most Sierra Leoneans.  The other controversial indictment94
was unsealed as Liberian President Taylor traveled to Ghana for peace
talks in mid-2003.  Prosecutor David Crane served an arrest warrant on95
Ghanaian authorities, and transmitted the warrant to Interpol.  The96
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http://charlestaylortrial.files.wordpress.com/2009/03/taylor-trial-monitoring-report-dec-08-jan-
09.pdf.
97. See SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, BACKGROUND ON PROSECUTOR V. CHARLES
GHANKAY TAYLOR (2008) [hereinafter SCSL BACKGROUND ON TAYLOR], available at
http://www.sc-sl.org/CASES/CharlesTaylor/tabid/107/Default.aspx. Taylor was indicted with
eleven counts for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and violations of international humanitarian
law. Id. 
98. See Ward, supra note 95, at 9-10 (discussing how some diplomats viewed the indictment
as naïve, as they had already pressed Ghana to guarantee Taylor’s immunity). 
99. Pham, supra note 94, at 99 (discussing the two month siege to unseat Taylor that took
place after he withdrew from talks). 
100. See Ward, supra note 95, at 10 (discussing the details of the exile agreement).
101. See Pressure Mounts for Taylor to Face Trial, U.N. INTEGRATED REG’L INFORMATIONAL
NETWORKS, Aug. 12, 2003, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/
sierra/2003/0813trial.htm. 
102. Priscilla Hayner, Director, Peace and Justice Program, International Center for
Transitional Justice, Paper Presentation at The International Peace Institute High-Level Retreat for
Senior International Decision-Makers: The Case of West Africa: Considering Liberia and Sierra
Leone [hereinafter Considering Liberia and Sierra Leone], 4 (Jan. 16-17, 2009) (copy on file with
author).
103. SCSL BACKGROUND ON TAYLOR, supra note 97.
104. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity from
Jurisdiction, ¶ 53 (May 31, 2004) (The Appeals Chamber held that Taylor’s official position was
not a bar to his prosecution by the Court). See also Mikhail Wladimiroff, Former Heads of State
on Trial, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 949, 963-64 (2005) (discussing Liberia’s initial complaint to the
International Court of Justice against Sierra Leone for violating the immunity of its Head of State).
105. See Taylor Missing from Nigerian Home, BBC NEWS, Mar. 28, 2006,
SCSL indicted Taylor for his alleged role in facilitating and fueling the
Sierra Leone civil war through his support of the RUF rebels.97
Diplomats regarded Taylor’s arrest as untenable due to the conflict
raging in Liberia.  Taylor immediately returned to Liberia,98
withdrawing from negotiations.  Nigeria then brokered a deal, granting99
Taylor asylum in return for his resignation.  Taylor acquiesced and100
took up residence in a seaside villa in Nigeria.  Taylor’s indictment101
“effectively removed” him as a “factor in any future Liberian
dispensation.”  102
The SCSL took Taylor into custody on March 29, 2006.103
Previously, Taylor had successfully engaged in a series of obstructionist
tactics to avoid the SCSL’s jurisdiction. Taylor filed a motion under
protest claiming sovereign immunity and requesting the Trial Chamber
to quash the indictment and declare null and void the warrant of arrest
and order for transfer of detention.  When the Nigerian President104
finally agreed to turn Taylor over for extradition, after the Government
of Liberia’s request, Taylor attempted to flee to Cameroon.  After his105
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http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/wanted/2006/0328missing.htm.
106. See generally Micaela Frulli, A Turning Point in International Efforts to Apprehend War
Criminals: The UN Mandates Taylor’s Arrest in Liberia, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 351, 352 (2006)
(discussing the UN Security Council’s Resolution which expanded UNMIL’s mandate to
apprehending and detaining Taylor).
107. See Lansana Fofana, Mixed Feelings Over Charles Taylor’s Transfer to the Hague, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, June 20, 2006, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/wanted/2006/
0620mixedfeelings.htm (quoting a British Diplomat in Freetown. “It is clear to us that Charles
Taylor still does command massive support  in the sub-region. We need to build on the hard-won
peace here rather than prepare its collapse.”); see also HUMAN RTS. WATCH, TRYING CHARLES
TAYLOR IN THE HAGUE: MAKING JUSTICE ACCESSIBLE TO THE MOST AFFECTED 2 (2006) (citing
Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Special Court President Requests Charles Taylor be
Tried in the Hague (Mar. 30, 2006), available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/ij/
ij0606/ij0606.pdf; U.N. Sec. Council, Letter dated 31 Mar. 2006 from the Permanent
Representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations to the President of the Security Council,
Annex II, U.N. Doc. S/2006/207 (Apr. 3, 2006) (expressing fear that trying Taylor in Sierra Leone
would destabilize the region); Michelle Faul, Prosecutor: Escape-Savvy Taylor Secure,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 31, 2006.
108. See Britain Offers to Jail Taylor, Paving Way for War Crimes Trial, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, June 15, 2006, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/wanted/
2006/0615britoffer.htm (discussing the condition imposed by the Netherlands for the SCSL to use
the ICC’s facilities; the Hague required another country to jail Taylor if the SCSL found him
guilty).
109. Centre for Conflict Resolution, Peace Versus Justice? Truth and Reconciliation
Commissions and War Crimes Tribunals in Africa [hereinafter Peace Versus Justice], 32, May 17-
18, 2007.
110. Taylor is the only high-profile defendant before the Court, as the SCSL has not concluded
trials against most of the top leaders of the other warring factions, for example, Foday Sankoh of
the RUF is dead, while Johnny Paul Koroma of the AFRC remains “at large.”
111. Interviews from Sierra Leone Assessment Mission, 19 interviews conducted with: former
staff of the TRC-SL, current staff of the SCSL, commissioners of the Human Rights Commission
for Sierra Leone (follow-up mechanism for TRC-SL), civil society leaders that worked with the
TRC-SL, human rights victims, professors, lawyers, and civil servants amongst others (November
3-13, 2008) [hereinafter Interviews from Sierra Leone Assessment Mission]; see Sirleaf, supra note
arrest,  Liberia transferred Taylor to the SCSL, which subsequently106
moved him to The Hague due to security concerns,  mainly emanating107
from Liberia, since it was just emerging out of conflict and there were
fears of a backlash from Taylor supporters. The International Criminal
Court (ICC) agreed to let the SCSL use its facilities for the trial.  The108
removal of Taylor’s trial from the region has caused controversy, since
many Sierra Leoneans “believe that he should be standing trial in
Freetown,” where the SCSL is located, and where the alleged “crimes
took place.”  Removing what is arguably one of the Court’s most109
important trials from the region,  diminishes the objective of making110
justice more locally relevant.  111
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25, app. (for full list of interviews). Several interviewees noted that the impact of the trial has been
less since the trial is not being held in the country (35% of 14 interviewees). Id. 
112. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-PT, Joint Decision on Defence Motions
on Adequate Facilities and Adequate Time for the Preparation of Mr. Taylor’s Defence, ¶ 21 (Jan.
23 2007), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/Documents/SCSL-03-01-PT-164.pdf. 
113. Scott Worden, Special Court of Sierra Leone Briefing: The Taylor Trial and Lessons from
Capacity-Building and Outreach, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, Aug. 2007, http://www.usip.org/pubs/
usipeace_briefings/2007/0821_special_court.html.
114. The Court was facing a major budget shortfall from May 2009 because a number of the
Court’s highest donors have had to reduce contributions due to the global financial crisis. See
Ozioma Enukoha, Liberia: Financial Crisis Court Considers Releasing Taylor, ALL AFRICA COM,
Feb. 24, 2009, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200902250129.html.
115. See Easterday, supra note 96, at 1. 
116. See Scott Stearns, Special Court Rejects Acquittal of Former Liberian President, VOA
NEWS, May 5, 2009, available at http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-05-04-voa19.cfm (noting
that the Defense case is scheduled to begin in June 2009). 
117. The Court has secured funding to see it to completion in 2010.
118. Press Release, The TRC-L, Statement of the TRC on the Current State of Affairs (Nov.
26, 2007), available at https://www.trcofliberia.org/news-1/press-releases/statement-of-the-trc-on-
the-current-state-of-affairs-11-26-2007/. 
119. A TRC Working Group was formed to oversee the reassessment, this Group includes the
TRC-L, the International Contact Group of Liberia whose membership includes the following: the
African Union, the Economy Community of West African States, the European Union, the U.S.
Embassy in Liberia and the U.N. Mission in Liberia. Id.
120. See Amnesty Int’l, Liberia Towards the Final Phase of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission [hereinafter Final Phase TRC-L], AI Index: AFR 34/002/2008, 8, July 29, 2008
(discussing how the Government is the largest single contributor to the TRC-L, particularly
considering its total national budget of $200 million).
121. See TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT OF THE TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION   COMMISSION   OF   LIBERIA   (TRC)   FINAL   REPORT   VOLUME   I:  FINDINGS  AND
Taylor’s trial was set to begin on June 4, 2007,  but the SCSL112
delayed it until January 7, 2008 because of Taylor’s concerns regarding
adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense.  The trial was to113
conclude in mid-2009, however, the SCSL has faced significant funding
challenges, which have delayed the trial.  The Prosecution rested in114
February 2009, with 91 witnesses testifying,  and the Defense set to115
begin its case soon thereafter.  The trial is scheduled to conclude in116
2010.  117
The TRC-L was formally inaugurated on February 20, 2006. The
TRC-L faced serious fiscal, administrative, logistical, management, and
human resources difficulties during its first year of operation,  but by118
2008 had undergone significant restructuring  and received $4.2119
million for its operations.  The TRC-L has collected some 20,000120
statements, including approximately 1,500 statements from Liberians in
the Diaspora.  As of December 2008, 800 people have narrated their121
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DETERMINATIONS, [hereinafter TRC-L INITIAL REPORT] vol. 1, at 46 (Jan. 24, 2009), available at
www.trcofliberia.org/reports/final. (No longer available on website as of Apr. 23, 2009).
122. Id. at 55. 
123. Id at 6 (discussing end of its mandate).
124. See TRC-L INITIAL REPORT, supra note 121, at 76-77. 
125. Special Court Ratification Act of 2002, § 21(2) [hereinafter SCSL Ratification Act],
available at http://www.sc-sl.org/Documents/SCSL-ratificationact.pdf. 
126. Marieke Wierda et al., Int’l Ctr. for Transitional Justice, Exploring the Relationship
between the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone 4-5
(2002) (revised version of paper presented to the U.N. Expert Group on the Relationship between
the TRC-SL and the SCSL in New York on Dec. 20-21, 2001), available at http://www.ictj.org/
images/content/0/8/084.pdf.
experiences during the conflict before the TRC-L’s public hearings.122
The TRC-L will conclude its work in June of 2009 and release its final
report.  The Initial Report released by the Commission on January 24,123
2009, indicated that it will make recommendations regarding
prosecution, reparations, national reconciliation, and amnesty.  The124
TRC-L’s recommendations regarding prosecution and the form of the
prosecutorial mechanism are greatly anticipated. Indeed, the SCSL’s
indictment of Taylor, and his subsequent arrest and transfer, captured
the imaginations of Liberians and raised the specter of justice. The
SCSL’s trial of Taylor, former President of Liberia and warlord, will
pose a significant constraint on the transitional justice process in
Liberia. The subsequent sections examine the most pressing of these
issues: the question of legal primacy, information sharing, and access to
detainees. Each section examines one of these challenges by first
looking at the experience of the SCSL and the TRC-SL as a guide, and
then discussing the ways in which the relationship between the SCSL
and the TRC-L will face similar and unique challenges. 
A. The Question of Legal Primacy
1. The SCSL and the TRC-SL 
A provision of the SCSL Agreement states, “Notwithstanding any
other law, every natural person, corporation or other body created by or
under Sierra Leone law shall comply with any direction specified in an
order of the Special Court.”  Several practitioners maintained that this125
provision “indicates that the relationship between the Special Court and
the Commission is therefore dictated by the broad powers of the Special
Court.”  Others pointed to the SCSL’s Statute, which only gave it126
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127. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 8(2), Jan. 16, 2002.
128. Abdul Tejan-Cole, The Complementary and Conflicting Relationship Between the Special
Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 6 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV.
L.J. 139, 151-52 (2003).
129. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity from
Jurisdiction, ¶ 1 (May 31, 2004) (Taylor’s counsel argued that the SCSL, as a national court, did
not have jurisdiction to indict Charles Taylor. The Court held that the SCSL is not part of Sierra
Leone’s judicial system but is a true international criminal court formed under international law).
130. See Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 8(2), Jan. 16, 2002 (establishing the
SCSL’s primacy over national courts, however, the TRC-L is not a national court or “any other
body organized under Sierra Leonean law”). 
131. See U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Impunity,Comm’n on Human Rts. Res. 2002/79,
¶ 10, 58th mtg., E/CN.4/RES/2002/79 (Apr. 25, 2002), available at http://ap.ohchr.org/
documents/E/CHR/resolutions/E-CN_4-RES-2002-79.doc (discussing the duty to “prosecute or
extradite” and noting that truth commissions are complements, not substitutes for a justice process).
primacy over national courts.  The rationale was that since the TRC-127
SL was not a national court, the SCSL could not have primacy over it.128
In essence, those who favored prosecutorial strategies saw the TRC-SL
as an investigative arm of the Court or similar to a grand jury, while
those that favored a truth-telling process insisted on the necessity of an
independent and dynamic Commission. The legal status of the TRC-SL
was an essential question because it in effect answered all others:
whether the confidentiality granted to statement givers by the TRC-SL
would be honored by the SCSL in its prosecutions, whether the SCSL
would grant access to detainees, and who would sit as the arbiter, if a
conflict arose. While in theory neither institution had legal primacy over
the other, in practice the TRC-SL was in many ways subordinate to the
SCSL. 
2. The SCSL and the TRC-L 
The SCSL is a hybrid court, akin to an international criminal
tribunal,  while the TRC-L is a national body. The SCSL’s Statute129
establishes its primacy over national courts;  however, no provision in130
the enabling documents of the SCSL and the TRC-L sheds light on
exactly what the relationship between the two bodies should be. The
most fundamental question raised by this circumstance is whether the
truth-telling process represented by the TRC-L, is subordinate to the
international criminal justice process represented by the SCSL.  This131
section examines the “duty to prosecute” and the “right to truth” under
international law and discusses which process, if any should take
prominence over the other. 
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132. See, e.g., M. CHERIF BASSIONI & EDWARD M. WISE, AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE: THE
DUTY TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 20-25 (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 1995); Diane Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2537 (1993); Naomi Rhot-Arriaza, State
Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law,
78 CAL. L. REV. 449, 451 (1990).
133. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide arts. 1, 4-6, Dec.
9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
134. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Prosecution of Civilian Persons in Times
of War, art. 146 Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva IV] (The duty to prosecute
“grave breaches” of the Geneva Conventions is located in common article 146 of the Geneva
Conventions). The most extensive definition of “grave breaches” is in Geneva IV, art. 147 it
includes willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, and willfully causing great suffering or
serious injury. Id. art. 147. 
135. Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and
in the Judgment of the Tribunal, [1950] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 97, Principle VI (c), available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/7_1_1950.pdf.
136. Statute of the International Tribunal art. 5, May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192.
137. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, July 17, 1998 37 I.L.M. 999
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
138. Id. art. 7 Crimes against humanity “means any of the following acts when committed as
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge
of the attack.” The crimes include murder, extermination, enslavement, torture, rape, deportation,
or forcible transfer of a population, and other inhumane acts. Id. 
i. The “Duty to Prosecute”
Many scholars of international law maintain that there is a “duty to
prosecute,” grave international crimes.  Some of these legal132
obligations are enshrined in international treaties, such as the duty to
prosecute genocide in the Convention on the Prevention and the
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.  In addition, the 1949 Geneva133
Conventions provides that States have an obligation to search for war
criminals and to bring them before their own courts or else extradite
them for trial in another jurisdiction.  Crimes against humanity were134
first recognized in the Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg
Tribunal.  Several international tribunals include crimes against135
humanity within their jurisdiction, including the ICTY,  and the136
ICC.  The Rome Statute of the ICC marked the first time ever that137
crimes against humanity were articulated in a treaty text.  138
Some scholars argue that customary international law also requires
prosecution for crimes against humanity. They claim that this duty can
be implied from international instruments like the Convention on the
Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes
against Humanity, and the Principles of International Co-operation in
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139. See, e.g., ROBERTSON, supra note 4, at 250; Roman Boed, The Effect of a Domestic
Amnesty on the Ability of Foreign States to Prosecute Alleged Perpetrators of Serious Human
Rights Violations, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 297, 314 (2002). 
140. Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment arts. 5, 7, 12 & 14, Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027. 
141. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [hereinafter ICCPR], art. 2, para. 3,
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
142. See ROBERTSON, supra note 4, at 248-49. 
143. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. On Prevention of Discrimination
& Prot. Of Minorities, The Administration of Justice & Human Rts. of Detainees, U.N. Draft Set
of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat
Impunity, Annex II, princ. 18, U.N.Doc.E/CN4/Sub2/1997/20/Rev1 (Oct. 3, 1997). 
144. See supra Part I, for a discussion of the benefits and goals of trials. 
the Detection, Arrest, Extradition, and Punishment of Persons Guilty of
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity.  However, customary139
international law is slow forming and has a high threshold: State
practice must have been both extensive and virtually uniform on the
sense of the norm invoked and should have occurred in such a way as to
show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is
involved (opinio juris). State practice does not necessarily confirm the
view that there is a “duty to prosecute” crimes against humanity. In fact,
even where international law obligations are clear on the duty to
prosecute those accused of grave international crimes, a cursory glance
at history exhibits that prosecutions of alleged perpetrators is
uncommon. 
One of the strongest examples of an obligation to prosecute
violations of international human rights is enshrined in the Convention
Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.  The main human rights treaties have no explicit140
provisions outlining the obligation to prosecute. Some scholars have
interpreted the provision of Article 2 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, which states that victims of human rights
violations “shall have an effective remedy,”  to support the “duty to141
prosecute.”  Additionally, the U.N. Draft Set of Principles for the142
Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat
Impunity, Principle 18 asserts that States have an obligation to
investigate violations and to act appropriately in respect of perpetrators
to ensure that States prosecute, put on trial, and duly punish
perpetrators.  Even in situations where there may not be a “hard”143
international legal “duty to prosecute” in the aftermath of mass atrocity,
this Article has outlined the strong moral, social, and political reasons to
pursue trials.  144
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145. Frédéric Mégret, In Defense of Hybridity: Towards a Representational Theory of
International Criminal Justice, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 725, 734 (2005).
146. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, STATE PARTIES TO THE MAIN INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW AND OTHER RELATED TREATIES 9-10 (2008), available at http://www.icrc.
org/eng/party_ccw. 
147. See Protocol Additional (NO. II) to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 6, para. 5, Dec.7,
1978, 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977) (noting that “at the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall
endeavor to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed
conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they
are interned or detained.”).
148. INT’L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, THE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF NON-
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH COMMENTARY 2 (2006), available at
http://www.michaelschmitt.org/images/Manual%5B1%5D.Final.Brill.pdf. Non-international armed
conflicts do not include conflicts in which two or more States are engaged against each other. Nor
do they encompass conflicts extending to the territory of two or more States. When a foreign State
extends its military support to the government of a State within which a non-international armed
conflict is taking place, the conflict remains non-international in character. Conversely, should a
foreign State extend military support to an armed group acting against the government, the conflict
will become international in character. Id; see also supra Part II (discussing the regional dynamics
of the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone). 
149. Geneva IV, supra note 134, art. 146. “Each High Contracting Party shall be under the
obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed,
such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own
courts. ” Id. 
When there are competing national claims for prosecuting grave
international crimes, which country should exercise its jurisdiction? It is
extremely difficult to determine “[w]ho should take precedence [,] [t]he
state that has [the] most victims [,] [t]he state whose nationality the
offender is from so that it can effect its own democratic transition?”145
In the case of Sierra Leone and Liberia, both countries have multilateral
treaty obligations which might weigh in favor of excercising
jurisdiction over Taylor. For example, Liberia and Sierra Leone are
State Parties to the four Geneva Conventions and its Additional
Protocols.  The duty to prosecute war crimes under the Geneva146
Conventions requires an international armed conflict, because under the
Conventions there simply is no duty to prosecute for non-international
armed conflicts.  Given the regional nature of the conflicts in Liberia147
and Sierra Leone, the conflicts are sufficiently “international” in
character for the four Geneva Conventions to apply.  148
The Geneva Conventions do not compel a State to bring individuals
accused of war crimes before its own courts in order to comply with its
obligations.  Rather, the Conventions allow a State “if it prefers, and149
in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, [may] hand
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150. Id. 
151. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 2-4, Jan. 16, 2002. 
152. SCSL Agreement, supra note 65, pmbl.
153. Id. art. 1. 
154. See Rena L. Scott, Moving from Impunity to Accountability in Post-War Liberia:
Possibilities, Cautions and Challenges, 33 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 345, 387-88 (2005) (discussing the
benefits of a Special Court for Liberia).
155. Interview with Sampson Towe, Co-Chair, Forum for the Establishment of a War Crimes
Court in Liberia, in Monrovia, Liberia. (Jan. 19, 2007). The motivations of this organization are
questioned within Liberia. Id. Interviews from Liberia Assessment Mission, 87 interviews (66 in
rural areas: Lofa (21), Nimba (12), Bong (18) and Grand Gedeh (15) counties, as well as
Montserrado (21)). The author conducted interviews with: human rights victims, staff of the TRC-
L, civil society leaders that work with the TRC-L and human rights victims, professors, lawyers,
civil servants, members of the diplomatic community, and U.N. personnel, amongst others
such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned,
provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie
case.”  This provision of the Geneva Conventions embodies the aut150
dedere, aut judicare principle, which is a jurisdictional agreement
among contracting States to extradite or prosecute offenders who
commit the acts proscribed by the treaty. The Government of Liberia
apparently preferred to hand Taylor “to another High Contracting
Party,” as opposed to exercising its own jurisdiction over war crimes. It
would certainly not be difficult for Sierra Leone to make out a “prima
facie case” for the exercise of its jurisdiction over Taylor. In addition to
the Geneva Conventions, Sierra Leone could point to the SCSL’s
Statute, which enables it to “prosecute persons who committed” crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and other seroius violations of
humanitarian law in the territory of Sierra Leone.”  The above analysis151
might lead to the presumption that the SCSL’s prosecution of Taylor
fulfills both Liberia and Sierra Leone’s “duty to prosecute.” However,
given the limited mandate of the SCSL, this conclusion would be
problematic. 
The SCSL’s trial of Taylor does not cover grave international crimes
occuring in the territory of Liberia. The SCSL’s jurisdiction for grave
international crimes is limited to events occurring in “the territory of
Sierra Leone”  and only “since 30 November 1996.”  Additionally,152 153
its temporal jurisdiction does not cover events occurring for the bulk of
the conflicts in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, which began in late 1989
and 1991 respectively. 
This has led to calls for the creation of a “Special Court for
Liberia.”  After Taylor’s arrest in 2006, a group called The Forum for154
the Establishment of a War Crimes Court in Liberia was formed.  The155
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(December 8-22, 2008; January 5-8 2009) [hereinafter Interviews from Liberia Assessment
Mission]; see Sirleaf, supra note 25, app. (for full list of interviews). Popular opinion variously
holds that the group is sponsored by former Taylor cronies seeking revenge for Taylor’s indictment,
or the Congress For Democratic Change (the main opposition party) in order to undermine the
Johnson Sirleaf administration. Id. Its advocacy efforts are regarded as political and confrontational.
Id. Due to this sentiment, much of the group’s advocacy efforts are not taken seriously. Id. 
156. See Franz Wild, Liberians Call for Own War Crimes Court, VOA NEWS, Apr. 12, 2006,
http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2006-04/Liberians-Call-for-Own-War-Crimes-Court.cfm.
157. Interview with Thomas A. Bureh, Chairman, Human Rights Protection Forum, in
Monrovia, Liberia (Jan. 11, 2007). (discussing the Secretary General’s reaction).
158. Interview with Jerome Verdier, supra note 1. 
159. See PRISCILLA HAYNER, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, CTR. FOR
HUMANITARIAN DIALOGUE, NEGOTIATING PEACE IN LIBERIA: PRESERVING THE POSSIBILITY FOR
JUSTICE 25 (2007), available at http://www.ictj.org/static/Africa/Liberia/HaynerLiberia1207.eng.
pdf. 
160. See Sirleaf, supra note 25, at 16-19, 21-26 (discussing alleged perpetrators behavior at
the TRC-L’s proceedings and the infighting within the Commission).
Forum collected signatures and filed a petition to the Liberian
Legislature.  The Forum also attempted to submit its petition to156
Secretary General Kofi Annan, but they were rebuffed because any
request for the creation of such a court would have to come from the
Government.  In addition, the Chairman of the TRC-L, Jerome157
Verdier commented that adopting a criminal justice approach at that
stage in Liberia’s transitional justice process would,
Undermine the reconciliation and peace building process
that the TRC is envisaged to undergo. . . . [A] parallel
process of prosecution and reconciliation . . . did not
work for Sierra Leone and there is no reason why it
should work for Liberia . . . . With [Liberians] input,
monitoring and active participation, there will be a clear
indication as to which way the country should go in
terms of addressing impunity.  158
The Liberian Government shared the belief that the TRC-L should
finish its work before questions about prosecution are raised.  159
During the TRC-L’s proceedings, the internal dysfunction of the
TRC-L concomitant with alleged perpetrator behavior at public
hearings,  led to further questions about whether a truth commission160
was the best option for Liberia as opposed to prosecutions. At a
commemoration of a massacre, a leader of the Catholic Church stated
that there can be “no reconciliation without justice,” and called for a
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161. See Press Release, TRC-L, Catholic Church Wants War Crimes Tribunal After TRC . . .
As Lutheran Massacre Commemoration Begins (July 16, 2008), available at www.trcofliberia.org/
news-1/press-releases/catholic-church-wants-war-crimes-tribunal-after-trc-as-lutheran-massacre-
commemoration-begins. The commemoration was mired in controversy due to the invitation of
known perpetrators to make statements. Interviews from Liberia Assessment Mission, supra note
155. 
162. See Press Release, The TRC-L, TRC Publishes List of Alleged Perpetrators and Persons





the-period-1979-2013-2003. The “List of Perpetrators” includes several internal repetitions so it
totals less than 198. Id. The TRC-L defined, “Persons of Interest,” as “those required to appear”
because of their “unique experiences and knowledge of events of the past. Id. This List similarly
includes internal repetitions totaling less than 139. Id. However, there do not appear to be any
repetitions between the “List of Perpetrators,” and the “List of Persons of Interest.” Id.
163. See Press Release, Amnesty Int’l, Liberia: Will Those Investigated by the Truth and
Reconciliation Ever Be Prosecuted? AI Index: AFR 34/010/2008 (Dec. 5, 2008) (noting that the
large number highlights the scale and gravity of the crimes committed in Liberia and calling on the
government of Liberia to investigate and prosecute all persons “reasonably suspected of serious
human rights violations.”).
164. TRC-L Act, supra note 85, art. VII, § 26(j) (iv).
165. See TRC-L INITIAL REPORT, supra note 121, at 76. The TRC-L did not indicate in its
report what the distinction was between “groups” or “entities.” Id. 
166. Annex II, defining “egregious” domestic crimes, which include mercenarism, official
repression, kidnapping, sexual assault, rape, offenses against property, theft, and/or illegal
disbursement of public money, and misuse of public money amongst others. See id. at 77, 80-88.
Gross human rights violations and serious international humanitarian law violations are defined
respectively in Annex 4 and 5. Id. at 76, 89-107. 
war crimes tribunal.  After the Commission’s “naming and shaming,”161
wherein the TRC-L published a list of “Perpetrators or Alleged
Perpetrators,” that the Commission deemed it needed in order to
respond to allegations of violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law levied against them by victims of the civil war,162
another demand for prosecutions was issued.  163
After the TRC-L investigations of violations occurring in Liberia, it
may recommend prosecutions in its final report “in particular cases as
[it] deems appropriate.”  The Initial Report of the TRC-L indicates164
that it will make recommendations for prosecutions of “individuals,”
“groups,” or “entities,”  who have committed “egregious” domestic165
and “gross” violations of international human rights law as well as
“serious” humanitarian law violations.  The Commission will not166
recommend amnesty for gross violations of human rights or serious
international humanitarian law violations, instead it “reserved the right”
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167. The Commission did not define “domestic and international crimes.” Id. at 77. 
168. Id. In interpreting the amnesty and prosecutorial provisions of the TRC-L Act discussed
above, the Commission effectively attempts to make participation with and conduct in the truth
telling process another factor in determining whether an individual should face prosecutions. Id.
169. Id. at 76. 
170. See HAYNER, supra note 159, at 24. 
171. Interview with Ezekiel Pajibo, supra note 84.
to recommend to a future prosecutorial mechanism, persons that it
determines are responsible for committing “domestic and international
crimes,”  but due to the “truthful,” and “remorseful,” nature of the167
testimony should not be prosecuted.  168
Further, the Commission stated that it would submit a
“comprehensive recommendation on the competence, jurisdiction,
structure, function, and other authority of the recommended criminal
court to the National Legislature and the President of Liberia.”  The169
TRC-L did not specify if the court will be national, hybrid, or
international, in nature, yet given the high costs of establishing any
court and the political will required for creating and funding a court, its
creation in Liberia is likely very low.
Yet, the SCSL’s prosecution of Taylor may have practically blocked
the TRC-L from making any recommendation regarding him. Many
Liberians want Taylor to be prosecuted for events occurring in their
own country.  As Ezekiel Pajibo, a Liberian human rights activist170
eloquently stated,
The criminal acts for which Mr. Taylor is being tried in
Sierra Leone [are] related to the criminal acts, which he
committed there and the Sierra Leonean people deserve
justice, . . . but that does not exonerate Taylor for the
crimes he committed here. Being tried in Sierre Leone
does not amount to being tried in Liberia. You can not
try someone for crimes committed in Sierra Leone and
say that they are for Liberia too. The people of this
country are aggrieved and we want justice in this
country.171
 
The SCSL’s indictment charged Taylor with individual criminal
responsibility for alleged acts of terrorism, murder, rape, sexual slavery
and violence, outrages upon personal dignity, violence and cruel
treatment, other inhumane acts, conscripting children into the armed
forces, enslavement, and pillaging, occurring in the territory of Sierra
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172. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Amended Indictment (Mar. 16,
2006). 
173. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 141, art. 14 (7), “No one shall be liable to be tried or
punished again for an offence for which he has already been finally convicted or acquitted in
accordance with the law and penal procedure of each country.” Id. 
174. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eighth Session, 51
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 37, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996), reprinted in [1996] 2(2) Y.B. INT’L
L. COMM’N 37, U.N. Doc. A/Cn.4/SER.A/1996/Add.1, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/
documentation/english/A_51_10.pdf. 
175. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 137, art. 171; Statute of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone art. 9, Jan. 16, 2002. 
176. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eighth Session,
supra note 174, at 38. The International Law Commission reasoned that “[t]he international
community should not be required to recognize a decision that is the result of such a serious
transgression of the criminal justice process.” Id. 
Leone.  Whether these charges constitute the same offense as crimes172
allegedly committed in Liberia raises questions about the principle of
non bis in idem or the prohibition of double jeopardy.  173
The International Law Commission has stated that the
[A]pplication of the non bis in idem principle under
international law is necessary to prevent a person who has
been accused of a crime from being prosecuted or punished
more than once for the same crime. This fundamental
guarantee protects an individual against multiple
prosecutions or punishments by a given State for the same
crime.  174
Furthermore, recent international criminal tribunals recognize the right
of an accused not to be placed in double jeopardy.  The only175
circumstances when the principle of non bis in idem would not apply is
when a perpetrator of international crimes has not been duly tried or
punished by a national court, where the justice system has not
functioned independently or impartially or where the proceedings were
designed to shield the accused from international criminal
responsibility.  There is no indication that the SCSL’s prosecution of176
Taylor is not being conducted in good faith and in accordance with
international norms and standards. 
Thus, if the TRC-L decided to recommend prosecution of Taylor for
crimes allegedly committed in Liberia, it may have to demonstrate that
crimes allegedly committed in Sierra Leone and those in Liberia do not
constitute “the same crime.” The TRC-L could stress that any
recommendation for prosecution of Taylor for crimes allegedly
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177. Liberia’s President Says No Reason for her Country to Try Charles Taylor, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Jan. 15, 2007. 
178. Joe De Capua, A Call for a Special Court in Liberia for Charles Taylor, VOA NEWS, Jan.
16, 2007, http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2007-01/2007-01-16-voa38.cfm. 
179. See generally Chernor Jalloh & Alhagi Marong, Ending Impunity: The Case for War
Crimes Trials in Liberia, 1 AFR. J. LEGAL STUD. 53, 78-79 (2005) (recommending prosecutions by
committed in Liberia, is in no way related to his current trial at the
SCSL and does not conflict with the prohibition of double jeopardy,
given that the alleged crimes are actually dissimilar – affecting different
victims, occurring in another country etc... If the TRC-L adopted this
approach, any such recommendation would be largely symbolic, if it
comes after conviction in the SCSL. 
The Liberian President may have preempted the TRC-L, when she
announced that it would be unnecessary for Liberia to prosecute Taylor.
The Liberian President concluded that, 
[O]ur war was regional . . . so if you get charged in
Sierra Leone, chances are the war was part of the same
Liberian war . . . [i]f you get charged there, you get
judged guilty or acquitted there. It has the same kind of
implication and ramifications for the other countries that
were involved in this cross-border war.”  177
Indeed, this Article has maintained that the conflicts in Liberia and
Sierra Leone formed part of a regional conflict complex with massive
human rights violations taking place in both States. However, since the
transitional justice mechanisms created in Liberia and Sierra Leone did
not follow the reality of conflict lines, it is inaccurate to assert that the
SCSL’s prosecution of Taylor for alleged crimes committed “in the
territory of Sierra Leone” has the same implications for Liberia. Former
Prosecutor for the SCSL David Crane commented, “Certainly I respect
President Sirleaf’s intentions and strategic looking forward, but . . .
[Taylor] destroyed two countries and the [SCSL] is addressing what he
did to Sierra Leone. And now it’s eventually time for justice to be done
in Liberia.”  The Prosecutor, who drafted Taylor’s initial indictment,178
recognizes that the SCSL has not charged and is not prosecuting Taylor
for any alleged crimes occurring in the territory of Liberia and
committed against the people of Liberia. Recognizing this paradoxical
situation, some scholars have advocated for an amendment of the
SCSL’s statute to be able to try war crimes and crimes against humanity
committed in Liberia.  This proposal has not been met with any179
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the Special Court for Sierra Leone as the most suitable option because of the link between the two
conflicts, amongst other reasons). 
180. SCSL Agreement, supra note 65, art. 22. 
181. Interviews from Liberia Assessment Mission, supra note 155. 
182. Id. (59% of 29 interviewees: “impunity unacceptable,” (8); “rule of law,” (4); “deterrent
value” (3)).
183. Id. Also variously because: there is “insufficient public awareness,” (4); “other actors
responsible for the war in Sierra Leone but he is the only one being tried,” (4); “people want to
move on,” (2); Taylor needed to face the TRC-L, before going to Hague” (2) “he should have been
tried in the region,” (2) “waste of resources,” (1). Id. 
184. Id. (24% of 29 respondents with only 1 from Monrovia). For example, one interviewee
indicated, “Trial is fine because we want to know good and bad done in Liberia, but not only Taylor
so many people were involved in the war.” Id. 
serious consideration, notwithstanding the ability to amend the
jurisdiction of the SCSL.  180
The failure to adopt a regional or transnational approach when
designing the transitional justice mechanisms in Liberia and Sierra
Leone may have resulted in the privileging of victims in Sierra Leone’s
interests for justice. Admittedly, the prosecution of Taylor before the
SCSL may have removed a threatening presence from the region
benefiting both victims in Sierra Leone and Liberia. However, recalling
that retribution is one of the main rationales for pursuing trials, since the
SCSL is only prosecuting Taylor for crimes allegedly committed in
Sierra Leone, only those victims’ desires for retribution can be met.
Indeed, while no public opinion studies have been conducted on
Taylor’s trial, field research indicates that public opinion on the trial in
Liberia is mixed.  When responding about the regional or continental181
significance of the trial, a sizable percentage of interviewees concluded
that it was significant, because it “demonstrates that impunity is
unacceptable,” promotes the “rule of law,” or for its “deterrent
value.”  However, most did not believe the trial was significant for182
Liberia, the responses varied, but the most common response was
because Taylor is “not being prosecuted for crimes allegedly committed
in Liberia.”  Interviewees that did regard the trial as significant for183
Liberia were mostly from rural areas and did not seem to realize that
Taylor was not on trial for acts allegedly committed in Liberia.  In184
contrast, in Sierra Leone, half of interviewees described the Taylor trial
as “very significant,” for the country, with an even larger percentage
thinking the trial was very important for the region, by helping to
address impunity in the region, contributing to regional stability and
peace in Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, and Liberia, and putting other leaders
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185. Interviews from Sierra Leone Assessment Mission, supra note 111 (50% of 14
interviewees said trial was very significant for Sierra Leone and 93% of 13 interviewees said the
trial was “very significant” for the region). 
186. See Charles Taylor Trial Report (May 1 - June 2, 2008), 10-13, available at
http://charlestaylortrial.files.wordpress.com/2008/06/trial-report-may-1-to-june-2008-21.pdf. See
also Charles Taylor Trial Report (May 5-22, 2008), 8-10, available at http://charlestaylortrial.
files.wordpress.com/2008/06/may-2008-trial-report1.pdf. 
187. Id. at 10 (May 1 – June 2, 2008). 
188. See Alloycious David, Benjamin Yeaten Indicted for Murder, LIBERIA WEBS, Jan. 21,
2009, available at http://liberiawebs.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=949%
3Aliberia-benjamin-yeaten-indicted-for-murder-&catid=81%3Apolitics&Item. 
189. See Charles Taylor Trial Report (February 4, - March 14, 2008), 6, available at
http://charlestaylortrial.files.wordpress.com/2008/04/trial-report3.pdf (summary of linkage witness
testimony Suwandi Camara). 
on notice that there is accountability for fomenting war in neighboring
countries.  185
Establishing the truth about war crimes is another rationale often
cited for trials after mass atrocity. The narrow mandate of the SCSL
both temporally and territorially means that the already limited ability
of trials to establish the truth about wartime atrocities is further
inhibited since the SCSL is not examining any of the atrocities that took
place in Liberia. Yet, many of the prosecution’s linkage witnesses have
testified about events regarding Liberia’s conflict, even though Taylor
is not being prosecuted for any of the alleged crimes committed in
Liberia. For example, Former Vice President, and former NPFL leader,
Moses Blah testified at length in Taylor’s trial and made several
damaging allegations about the early formation of the NPFL, detailing
the involvement of Libya and Burkina Faso in Liberia’s conflict,
discussing the execution of high ranking individuals allegedly under
Taylor’s orders in Liberia, and other NPFL crimes, as well as discussing
arm shipments.  Blah also testified about the role of Benjamin Yeaten,186
Taylor’s feared “Executioner in Chief,” and former Director of Taylor’s
Special Security Services (SSS),  whom the Government of Liberia187
indicted in January of 2009 for murder.188
Another linkage witness and former SSS operative testified about
Taylor’s alleged organization of a proxy force to fight in a region in
Liberia where Taylor was ostensibly engaged in peace negotiations with
the main warring faction.  Testimony also involved allegations from189
Joseph D. Marzah, one of the initial leaders of the NPFL, who testified
about the initial invasion of Liberia in 1989, the trading of diamonds for
weapons, and the Camp Carter Massacre, wherein over 600 Liberian
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190. Id. at 12. 
191. See Charles Taylor Trial Report (January 7 - February 1, 2008), 3-4, available at
http://charlestaylortrial.files.wordpress.com/2008/02/trial-report1.pdf. 
192. See BASS, supra note 5, at 286-304 (for a further discussion of the weaknesses of the
presumed goals of trials).
193. See HAYNER, supra note 159, at 31 (citing human rights advocates). See also Juan
Méndez, Accountability for Past Abuses, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 255, 261 (1997). 
194. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 19, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
195. American Convention on Human Rights art. 13, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
196. African (Banjul) Charter on Human and People’s Rights art. 9, June 26, 1981, 21 I.L.M.
59 (1982). 
197. See Protocol Additional (NO. I) to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and
civilians were allegedly murdered under Taylor’s orders.  Moreover,190
Varmuyan Sherrif, former member of a rival warring faction in Liberia,
and former member of Taylor’s SSS, testified about the Liberians
United for Reconciliation and Democracy’s attack on the country in the
late 1990s, amongst others.  The level of detail and important191
disclosures revealed at Taylor’s trial, are astounding since many of the
events alleged by linkage witnesses fall outside the temporal and
territorial jurisdiction of the SCSL. Ultimately, the SCSL will not be
adjudicating any of the crimes allegedly committed by Taylor in Liberia
after subjecting the accusations to its strict evidential and procedural
standards. Thus, the one-sided prosecution of Taylor has obscured his
alleged involvement in atrocities in Liberia. Furthermore, it has also
limited the already tenuous ability of such trials to individualize guilt,
deter war criminals, and rehabilitate countries,  since the trial does not192
concern any human rights abuses allegedly committed in Liberia. The
above analysis illustrates some of the problems encountered when
transitional justice mechanisms are not designed based on conflict lines.
ii. “The Right to Truth”
Some argue that the right to truth is a fundamental emerging
principle of international human rights law, and central to the project of
confronting transitions to democracy and the legacy of massive human
rights violations.  Proponents of the “right to truth” locate it in the193
right to “seek, receive and impart information,” in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,  the American Convention on Human194
Rights,  and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,195
“right to receive information.”  The principle of a general “right to196
truth,” is usually traced back to the codification of the right in cases of
missing persons in the Geneva Conventions.  197
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Relating to the Protection of Victims International Armed Conflicts art. 32, 33, Dec. 7, 1979, 16
I.L.M. 1391 (1977) (noting that state parties shall be “prompted mainly by the right of families to
know the fate of their relatives,” and to “search” for missing persons as soon as possible). 
198. See Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4 (July 29,
1988).
199. Id. ¶¶ 174 & 181. 
200. See Barrios Altos Case, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, ¶¶ 47-49 (May 14,
2001); see also Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 70,
¶¶ 200 - 202 (Nov. 25, 2000). 
Given the prevalence of enforced disappearances in the 1970s, the
concept of the “right to truth” has been developed through the
jurisprudence of the Inter-American human rights bodies. For example,
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights first addressed an
independent “right to truth” in the 1988 case of the disappearance of
Velásquez Rodríguez in Ecuador.  The Inter-American Court of198
Human Rights concluded that, 
The State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to
prevent human rights violations and to use the means at
its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of
violations committed within its jurisdiction, to identify
those responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment
and to ensure the victim adequate compensation . . . .
The duty to investigate facts . . . continues as long as
there is uncertainty about the fate of the person who has
disappeared.  Even . . . [where] those individually
responsible for crimes . . . cannot be legally punished . . .
the State is obligated to use the means at its disposal to
inform the relatives of the fate of the victims and, if they
have been killed, the location of their remains.199
Significantly, “the right to truth” is conceived as part of the general
obligation of the state to investigate or to collaborate in the
investigation of crimes, as part of the state’s “duty to prosecute.” This
case indicates that where there is no opportunity for judicial action
against the alleged perpetrators of the crime, the “right to truth”
becomes even more important. Recent decisions of the Inter-American
Human Rights Court have recognized the “right to truth” about alleged
human rights violations, but have held that it was unnecessary to
consider this right as a separate issue, since the Court addressed the
“right to truth” as part of the violation of the right to a fair trial and the
right to judicial protection.  Indeed, in the Barrios Altos Case, the200
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201. Barrios Altos Case, No. 75 ¶ 48 (stating that articles 8 and 25 of the American
Convention on Human Rights provide for the right to a fair trial and the right to judicial protection
respectively). 
202. See, e.g., Amnesty International v. Sudan, Afr. C. H. P. R., Comms. No. 48/90, 50/91,
52/91, 89/93, ¶ 54 (1999) (discussing the right to truth in relation to torture); Cyprus v. Turkey,
App. No. 25781/94 35 Eur. Ct. H. R. 967 ¶ 136 (2001) (discussing the right to truth in relation to
an effective investigation).
203. See, e.g., Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law, Principles 11, 22 (b) and 24, G.A. Res. 60/147, Annex, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/147 (Mar. 21, 2006); U.N. Hum. R. Comm., Right to Truth, Res. 2005/66, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/RES/2005/66 (Apr. 20, 2005).
204. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n. on Human Rights, Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights: Study on the Right to Truth [hereinafter Study on the Right to Truth],
Report of the Office of the U.N. Human Rights Commissioner for Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2006/91 (Feb. 8, 2006). 
205. Id. ¶¶ 55, 58. The Inter-American Human Rights Commission has also maintained that,
“[e]very society has the inalienable right to know the truth about past events, as well as the motives
and circumstances in which aberrant crimes came to be committed, in order to prevent repetition
of such acts in the future.” See INTER-AM. C. H.R., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1985-1986 CH. V (1986).
206. Id. ¶ 59.
Court held that, “the right to the truth is subsumed in the” rights
provided for in “Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention.”  201
The jurisprudence of other regional bodies also supports the
recognition of a “right to truth.” For example, Both the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the European Court of
Human Rights have inferred the right to truth with respect to torture, as
well as the right to an effective investigation.  The recognition of the202
“right to truth” is also supported by several international resolutions.203
Moreover, the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights conducted a study, which sought to articulate the scope, content,
and holders of the “right to truth,” after reviewing the legal and
historical basis for the right.  The study concluded that, “the right to204
truth about gross human rights violations and serious violations of
humanitarian law is an inalienable and autonomous right,” held by
“victims and their relatives,” as well as “society.”  The report found205
that the right to truth “implies knowing the full and complete truth as to
events that transpired, their specific circumstances, and who
participated in them, including knowing the circumstances in which the
violations took place, as well as the reasons for them.”  206
However, it is unclear whether State practice reflects recognition of
the “right to truth.” Recalling that international customary law is formed
when State practice is both extensive and virtually uniform on the sense
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207. Id. ¶ 31. 
208. Id. ¶ 32 (discussing the freedom of information legislation in the U.S. and South Africa).
209. Id. ¶ 50. 
210. Only in two of these cases has the right to truth been explicitly relied upon. Id. ¶ 14 and
n. 23 (citing the Mexican truth commission agreement, and the final report of the TRC-SL). 
211. See supra Part III for further discussion.
212. See supra Part I for further discussion.
of the norm invoked and occurs in a way to demonstrate a general
recognition that a legal obligation is involved (opinio juris). Yet, most
national constitutions do not specifically recognize the “right to
truth,”  although, some States have laws on access to information, that207
have been used for disclosures on human rights violations.  The208
increasing use of truth commissions and commissions of inquiry to
investigate gross violations of human rights, with up to 40 created
between 1974 and 2005,  may provide some evidence of State209
practice. However, it is far from clear that States have created these
bodies out of a sense of a legal obligation.  Indeed, the discussion of210
the establishment of the TRC-SL and the TRC-L  highlighted the211
many political considerations that factor into the establishment of a
truth commission, including the desire to forego prosecutions of alleged
perpetrators. Thus, while an emerging norm may be developing there is
no evidence of uniform State practice that a rule of international law has
developed recognizing “the right to truth.” The “right to truth” is best
envisaged as an “aspirational” right. Nonetheless, this Article has
detailed the potential moral, political, and social imperatives for
pursuing “truth-telling.”  212
Even if one accepts that there is a “right to truth,” where multiple
victims and societies are affected, who possesses this “right”? Where
massive human rights violations have been committed in multiple
societies, which society’s “right to truth” should be determinative?
Where massive human rights violations are not limited to one State, and
one society’s pursuit of “truth” and another society’s pursuit of
“justice” are in conflict, which society’s right should be privileged?
Should one society’s rights be balanced against the other? These are
complex questions to have to answer, yet they are presented by the
absurd consequence when transitional justice mechanisms have been
established without regard to the regional or transnational nature of
human rights violations. 
The Study on the Right to Truth found that “international criminal
tribunals,” “may constitute important tools for ensuring the right to the
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213. Study on the Right to Truth, supra note 204, ¶ 61.
214. Id.
215. See generally Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002.
216. See Special Court for Sierra Leone [SCSL], Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 74
[hereinafter SCSL Rules of Procedure and Evidence], available at http://www.sc-
sl.org/documents.html. 
217. The Study on the Right to Truth notes that some countries “allow third parties and NGOs
to intervene in criminal proceedings.” Study on the Right to Truth, supra note 204, ¶ 48 & n. 135
(citing Columbia, France, and Spain).
218. Id. ¶ 50.
truth.”  Yet, the above discussion has shown that the SCSL’s213
prosecution of Taylor is not fulfilling its obligation to Liberian human
rights victims and their relatives, nor Liberian society’s “right to truth.”
At best, Taylor’s prosecution before the SCSL fulfills Sierra Leone’s
duty to investigate facts of violations committed within its jurisdiction,
and fulfills its obligation towards Sierra Leonean human rights victims
and Sierra Leone’s society to truth. The SCSL’s prosecution of Taylor
has also arguably prevented judicial action on the part of Liberia as
demonstrated above. Consequently, the “right to truth” maybe even
more salient for Liberians. 
The Study on the Right to Truth proposed that criminal prosecutions
utilize a “broad legal standing in the judicial process for any wronged
party and to any person or non-governmental organization having a
legitimate interests therein,” as “essential to ensuring the right to
truth.”  There are no provisions in the Statute of the Special Court for214
Sierra Leone, which grant standing to States, organizations, or victims
to participate in its proceeding.  While the Rules of Procedure provide215
for amicus curiae, the role of the “state, organization, or person to make
submissions” is limited to the “issue specified by the Chamber.”216
Further, participating as amicus curiae, and having legal standing to
participate and intervene in a case are quite distinct as the former
involves contributing information that may help the Court arrive at its
final decision, while the latter involves having ones legal claims
adjudicated. The analysis above has depicted the legitimate interest of
Liberian victims and their families as well as Liberian society in the
SCSL’s proceedings against Taylor. Thus, arguably the proceedings
before the SCSL should have allowed some type of standing
particularly regarding human rights victims, which would be directly
impacted by the outcome of the trial.  217
The Study on the Right to Truth also observes that truth
commissions can play “an important role in . . . uncovering truth,”218
Section C (II) below discusses the ways in which the SCSL’s
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219. Wierda et al., supra note 126, at 8. 
220. See Charles Cobb, Jr., Sierra Leone’s Special Court: Will It Hinder or Help?, ALL
AFRICA.COM, Nov. 21, 2002, http://allafrica.com/stories/200211210289.html.
prosecution of Taylor may have limited the TRC-L’s ability to do so.
The next section considers the question of information sharing between
the transitional justice mechanisms, examining issues of confidentiality
of testimony and the pereception of information sharing.
B. Information Sharing
1. The SCSL and the TRC-SL
The issue of whether the TRC-SL and the SCSL would share
information was a critical one for the transitional justice process in
Sierra Leone. Marieke Wierda, Head of the Prosecutions Program for
the ICTJ, who has done significant work on the transitional justice
process in Sierra Leone, proposed three conceptual models of thinking
about information sharing in relationships between courts and truth
commissions: 
1. The “fire wall” model, in which there would be no
information sharing from the Commission to the Court. 
2. The “free access” model, in which all Commission
information would be available to the Court. 
3. The “conditional sharing” model, in which there
would be some information shared between the
Commission and the Court.  219
The Chief Prosecutor of the SCSL seemingly put an end to questions by
making it clear that he had no plans to seek or use information collected
by the TRC-SL.  Despite the adoption of the firewall model, the220
perception that there was information sharing may have significantly
compromised the work of the TRC-SL. 
Due to administrative delays, the TRC-SL’s statement-taking phase,
and hearings phase coincided with the SCSL’s indictments, which
resulted in widespread fears by ex-combatants that the TRC-SL could
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221. ROSALIND SHAW, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, RETHINKING TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
COMMISSIONS: LESSONS FROM SIERRA LEONE 4 (2005); See also POST-CONFLICT REINTEGRATION
INITIATIVE FOR DEV. AND EMPOWERMENT (PRIDE) & INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, EX-
COMBATANT VIEWS OF THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION AND THE SPECIAL COURT
IN SIERRA LEONE 19 (2002), available at http://www.ictj.org/images/content/0/9/090.pdf.
222. Interview with Gavin Simpson, Former Researcher, Sierra Leone Truth and
Reconciliation Comm’n, in Freetown, Sierra Leone (July 18, 2005). But see William A. Schabas,
Conjoined Twins of Transitional Justice? The Sierra Leone Truth & Reconciliation Commission
and the Special Court, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1082, 1091 (2004) (wherein the former TRC-SL
Commissioner William Schabas maintained that the impact of the SCSL on the willingness of
perpetrators to come forward to the TRC-SL is impossible to assess and that many perpetrators
cooperated with the Commission). 
223. TRC-SL REPORT, supra note 57, vol. 3b, ch. 6, at 378. 
224. But see Tom Perriello & Marieke Wierda, The Special Court for Sierra Leone Under
Scrutiny [hereinafter SCSL Under Scrutiny], Int’l Ctr. for Transitional Justice, 42, March 2006
(arguing that the existence of the SCSL did not undermine the TRC-SL’s ability to function, and
that the coexistence of the institutions was not a policy failure). Indeed, many international
observers do not regard the complications faced by the interactions between the two institutions as
be a covert conduit for the SCSL.  As Gavin Simpson, Former221
Researcher for the TRC-SL, attests,
So much time was expended convincing perpetrators
that talking to the [TRC-SL] would be done without
prejudice and without fear of consequence because their
first impression was always that the information would
be relayed to the [SCSL] either, to prosecute them, or to
prosecute somebody who was close to them.222
The simultaneous operation of the TRC-SL and SCSL without any
coordination undoubtedly led to confusion of the Sierra Leonean public
and particularly ex-combatants. The final report of the TRC-SL found
that many, 
[W]ere reluctant to participate in the truth telling
process out of fear of prosecution by the [SCSL] . . . .
The Commission’s ability to create a forum of exchange
between victims and perpetrators was unfortunately
retarded by the presence of the [SCSL].223
Even though the SCSL and the TRC-SL reached consensus on
whether or not information would be shared between the two
institutions, the mere perception of information sharing was seemingly
enough to frustrate the operations of at least one of the institutions.224
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fundamentally affecting either institution. Id. This is in marked contrast to the majority of Sierra
Leoneans who view the coexistence as a mistake that should not be replicated. See F. of
Conscience, Searching for the Truth and Reconciliation in Sierra Leone: An Initial Study of the
Performance and Impact of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission [hereinafter Searching for
the Truth], 5-6 (2005). 
225. TRC-L Act, supra note 85, art. VII § 26(m).
226. Id. 
227. SCSL Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 216. “At the request of either party
or of its own motion, a Judge or a Trial Chamber may issue such orders, summonses, subpoenas,
warrants and transfer orders as may be necessary for the purposes of an investigation or for the
preparation or conduct of the trial.” Id; see also SCSL Ratification Act, supra note 125, § 21(2).
228. Id. § 20.
2. The SCSL and the TRC-L
The issue of information sharing was unspecified between the TRC-
L and the SCSL. Yet, a number of their provisions were potentially
conflicting. For example, the TRC-L’s Act empowers the Commission
to take testimony on a confidential basis: 
At the discretion of the TRC, any person, group of
persons or organizations or institutions shall be permitted
to provide information . . . to the TRC on a confidential
or non-confidential basis and the TRC shall not be
compelled by any authority to disclose any such
information given to it in confidence.  225
Under the Act, the TRC-L cannot be compelled to produce evidence to
the SCSL.  However, the Prosecutor could theoretically request an226
order for the production of evidence.  Orders of the SCSL “shall have227
the same force or effect as if it had been issued by a Judge, Magistrate,
or Justice of the Peace of a Sierra Leone court.”  However, no treaty228
or domestic statute exists outlining the enforcement of foreign
judgments or orders between Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
Moreover, the TRC-L Act states that the Commission has the power
to
[G]ather, by means it deems appropriate, any
information it considers relevant, including the ability to
request reports, assistance of foreign governments, non-
resident Liberians, records, documents or any
information from any source, including governmental
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229. TRC-L Act, supra note 85, art. VIII § 27(a); see also id. art. VIII § 27(e).
230. Id. art. VIII § 27(b)(i -ii) & § 28 The Special Magistrate “shall issue or cause to be issued
a warrant of search and seizure, warrant of arrest for contempt, subpoenas, and citations to procure
information and testimonies in furtherance of the work of the TRC to visit any establishment or
place without giving prior notice, and to enter upon any land or premises . . . for the purpose of
obtaining testimonies which may be vital to the work of the TRC. (ii) Shall conduct hearings for
contempt of the Special Magistrate. . . . Any person who willfully obstructs or otherwise interferes
with the work of the TRC or any of its members or officers in the discharge of their functions under
this Act, commits an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine . . . for the first offence to
include a term of imprisonment not less than six months or both fine and imprisonment depending
on the gravity of the offence.” Id. art. VIII § 27(b)(i -ii) & § 28. 
231. See SCSL Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 216, RR. 66 & 67.
232. Id. at R. 70.
233. The TRC-L began public hearings on January 9, 2008. See Press Release, The TRC-L,
TRC Hearings (Jan. 9, 2008), available at https://www.trcofliberia.org/news-1/press-releases/trc-
hearings-1-9-2008/. The SCSL delayed Taylor’s trial, which began on January 7, 2008. See Arthur
Max, Taylor War Crimes Trial to Resume in January, ASSOCIATED PRESS, (Dec. 12, 2007). 
234. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity from
Jurisdiction, § 2 ¶ 9 (ii) (May 31, 2004) (The Defense submitted that it did not have adequate time
authorities, and to compel the production of such
information as and when necessary.229
The TRC-L Act provides for a Special Magistrate who ranks as a
Circuit Judge and has the power to enforce the above-mentioned
provision by issuing warrants of arrest for contempt, subpoenas, and
citations, as well as fines for non-cooperation.  The Rules of230
Procedure and Evidence for the SCSL, only provide for disclosure of
materials by the Prosecutor to the Defense and reciprocal disclosure by
the Defense.  It is unlikely that the Defense would ever voluntarily231
want to share its evidence with the TRC-L. While the Prosecutor cannot
disclose confidential information,  it is feasible that during232
investigations the Prosecutor might come across information that is not
relevant to the preparation of its case before the SCSL, which might be
relevant to the TRC-L’s investigations. Notwithstanding the ambiguity
in their founding documents, and the potential for conflict, the SCSL
and the TRC-L did not reach an agreement on whether information
would be shared between the two to further their respective
investigations. 
Due to administrative delays, the TRC-L’s hearings phase coincided
with the trial of Taylor, which began on January 7, 2008.  Unlike in233
the case of the TRC-SL, the Prosecutor of the SCSL never announced
that he would not seek to use testimony provided before the TRC-L.
However, given the amount of evidence amassed  prior to the advent234
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to prepare its defense due in part to “the volume of material disclosed by the Prosecution, including
the reports of proposed experts.”).
235. See TRC-L INITIAL REPORT, supra note 121, at 55. 
236. Interviews from Liberia Assessment Mission, supra note 155.
237. Interview with Jerome Verdier, supra note 1. 
238. A Petition for a Writ of Prohibition Growing Out of the Ongoing Evidence Gathering
Receipt, Recording & Publication Mechanism Of The Truth & Reconciliation Commission Against
Former Liberian President Charles G. Taylor, His Excellency, Charles G. Taylor, former President
of the Republic of Liberia currently facing War Crimes Charges at the International Criminal Court
in the Hague, Holland represented by the Association for the Legal Defense of former President
Charles Ghankay Taylor represented by its’ Chairman and Executive Director, Hon. John T.
Richardson of Monrovia City, Republic of Liberia, Petitioner v. The Truth & Reconciliation
Commission of the Republic of Liberia, represented by its’ Chairman, Cllr. Jerome Verdier of the
City of Monrovia, Respondent [hereinafter Petition for a Writ of Prohibition] (Supreme Court of
Liberia, Oct. 24, 2006) (on file with author).
239. Day of Reckoning, ANALYST, Oct. 11, 2006, at 7 (on file with author). Michael Biddle,
son of former opposition political leader, testified that a rebel commander of Taylor’s NPFL
confessed to him that he murdered his father. Id. Also, Mohammed Sheriff, former rebel for the
United Liberation Movement of Liberia, testified that Sam Bockarie (indicted by the SCSL) was
on a “military mission” in Côte d’Ivoire when Benjamin Yeaten, Director of the SSS, ordered him
to return to Liberia. Id. Sheriff stated that at a border town between Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire,
Yeaten, in the presence of Vice President Moses Blah, murdered Bockarie and ordered that his
wife, mother, and two kids be killed in order to prevent them from testifying about his death before
the SCSL. Id. 
of public hearings, such testimony was likely not deemed essential to
the Prosecution. As of December 2008, of the 800 people who appeared
before the TRC,  a significant percentage has been alleged235
perpetrators.  The Chairman of the TRC-L asserted that when, 236
People appear before the TRC, their statements, or
testimonies are protected and the TRC does not and will
not share its information with any prosecuting authority,
nor will the TRC proffer any of its evidence in the
prosecution of anybody who appears before the TRC.237
However, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the SCSL do not
contain a rule against hearsay, so testimony before the TRC-L is
potentially admissible before the SCSL. 
The issue of information sharing came to the fore; soon after the
TRC-L began statement taking, when the Association for the Legal
Defense of Taylor took the Commission to the Supreme Court of
Liberia.  The TRC-L held a symbolic ceremony in October 2006 to238
mark the beginning of statement taking, and the statements given
contained damaging allegations regarding Taylor and his cohorts.  The239
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240. Petition for a Writ of Prohibition, supra note 238, ¶ 5. 
241. Id. 
242. Id.
243. Id. ¶ 8.
244. Interview with John T. Richardson, Former National Security Advisor and Former
Executive Director and Chairman, Association for the Legal Defense of Former President Ghankay
Taylor, in Monrovia, Liberia. (Jan. 18, 2007). The Supreme Court decision referenced in this
interview is unpublished at the time of writing. The Association originally organized to assist in
raising funds for Taylor’s legal defense and to advocate for a fair trial is no longer active. Id. 
Petition for a Writ of Prohibition alleges that, among other things the
“publication of prejudicial evidence may have negative effects on the
ongoing trial in the Hague” of Taylor.  Moreover, that evidence240
“covering the war years in Sierra Leone and Republic of Liberia are
similar; and evidence gathered in Liberia involving the Petitioner,
would easily be connective of similar crimes committed in Sierra
Leone.”  The Association maintained that the TRC-L compromised241
Taylor’s right to a free and fair trial at the SCSL.  242
Due to the fear that information gathered by the TRC-L would be
used by the SCSL in its prosecution of Taylor, the Association
requested that the Supreme Court prohibit the TRC-L 
[F]rom ever receiving any witness, any evidence
operating against the petitioner; and secondly that the
Respondent Commission be prohibited from the official
usage of any of the evidence produced and recorded at
the T.R.C. . . . that all such evidences be declared . . .
null and void and not usable in any Court or tribunal in
and out of Liberia.  243
According to the Association, “the Supreme Court ruled against our
writ, stating that we were not legally clothed to protect Mr. Taylor’s
rights . . . and that if Mr. Taylor had those issues he should raise them
himself.”  This incident demonstrates the problems caused by failing244
to establish how each institution would treat information from the
other’s proceedings. It also highlights how a truth commission’s
proceedings may negatively influence an ongoing trial. Further, it
illustrates the importance of creating transitional justice mechanisms
that take into consideration the regional or transnational nature of
human rights violations. The next section considers the issue of the
TRC-L seeking access to Taylor to further its investigations.
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245. See Allen, supra note 62, at 69.
246. TRC-SL REPORT, supra note 57, vol. 3B, ch. 6, at 382.
247. After the Commission concluded public hearings, Norman indicated that he was
interested in testifying, stating, “I would prefer to be heard by the people of Sierra Leone and also
be recorded for posterity . . .” Letter from Hinga Norman, former Deputy Minister of Defense,
National Coordinator for CDF and SCSL detainee, to J.B. Jenkins-Johnston, Lawyer for Norman
(Aug. 26, 2003) (citied in TRC-SL REPORT vol. 3B ch. 6, at 383 n.75).
248. TRC-SL REPORT, supra note 57, vol. 3B, ch. 6, at 383.
249. See SCSL Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 216, R 33(D).
250. Registrar of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Practice Direction on the Procedure
Following a Request by a State, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, or Other Legitimate
Authority to take a Statement From a Person in the Custody of the Special Court for Sierra Leone,
¶¶ 4 (3) & 5 (Oct. 4, 2003) [hereinafter Revised Practice Direction], available at http://www.sc-
C. Access to Detainees
1. The SCSL and the TRC-SL: The Case of Hinga Norman
The crucial question that defined the nature of the relationship
between the TRC-SL and the SCSL was the issue of access to the
detainees of the SCSL by the TRC-SL. As the SCSL had in its custody
some of the leaders from the key factions, the TRC-SL sought to
capitalize on their testimonies to help it establish an impartial historical
record. In some of the testimony given before the TRC-SL, the names
of those detained by the Court came up as witnesses or actors in the
events related to the war.  Initially, the investigative arm of the TRC-245
SL approached the SCSL, but the Registrar of the SCSL advised the
TRC-SL that the detainees did not wish to speak with the TRC-SL
while their trials were pending.  By August 2003, some of the246
detainees began to give notice of their desire to testify before the TRC-
SL; Chief Samuel Hinga Norman’s application to testify  was247
followed by two others.248
In response to the TRC-SL’s request, the SCSL created a Practice
Direction,  which outlined the procedures to request access to249
detainees. The TRC-SL believed the policies outlined in the Practice
Direction undermined the confidentiality granted in its Act for
testimony and presented the risk of an Accused incriminating himself,
because the Registrar could forward testimony to the Prosecution. In
response, the Registrar created a Revised Practice Direction, which
allowed limited confidentiality and stipulated that the SCSL would
grant requests if the detainee gave informed consent, and unless
granting access would be against the “interests of justice” or would
denigrate “the integrity of the proceedings of the” SCSL.  While the250
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sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=8km93ZzghVU%3d&tabid=176. 
251. See Schabas, supra note 222, at 1094 (discussing how the Commission was dissatisfied
with the Practice Direction’s procedure for conducting confidential interviews, but agreed with the
public hearings procedure).
252. Id. 
253. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2003-08-PT, Decision on Appeal by the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone (“TRC” or “The Commission”) and Chief
Samuel Hinga Norman JP Against the Decision of His Lordship, Mr. Justice Bankole Thompson
Delivered on 30 October 2003 To Deny the TRC’s Request to Hold a Public Hearing with Chief
Samuel Hinga Norman JP (Nov. 28, 2003). 
254. See Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2003-08-PT, Decision on the Request of the
Truth & Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone to Conduct a Public Hearing with Samuel
Hinga Norman, ¶ 3 (Oct. 29, 2003), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=
wZfWNvJbMvU%3d&tabid=153. 
255. Id. 
256. Id. ¶ 1(b). 
257. Id. ¶ 1(c).
258. Id. ¶ 1(d). 
259. Id. ¶ 16.
260. Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2003-08-PT, Decision on the Request of the Truth
TRC-SL still had concerns about the potential use of testimony by the
SCSL,  faced with the termination of its mandate, the TRC-SL in a251
joint application with Defense counsels resubmitted separate requests to
hold public hearings.  The requests were in accordance with the252
Revised Practice Direction but the SCSL denied both of the TRC’s
requests.  253
The Prosecution argued that it would not be in the interest of justice
for Norman to plead his case in public before his trial, or to allow a
hearing with the potential to affect witnesses adversely.  The254
Prosecutor also noted that the hearing might upset the fragile peace in
Sierra Leone due to the large number of Norman supporters.  The255
TRC-SL responded “that any claim that a hearing would be sub judice
was without factual basis and jurisprudential support.”  The256
Commission also noted that there were already strict protective
measures in place for witnesses, and any claims about hearings as a
forum for witness intimidation were merely speculative.  The257
Commission argued that rather than threatening peace in Sierra Leone,
the Commission actually contributed to its consolidation.  258
Judge Thompson denied Norman’s application, holding that such a
proceeding would jeopardize the interests of justice and the preservation
of the integrity of the proceedings.  He reasoned that a public hearing259
with Norman on the subject of his role in the conflict would clash with
his right to be presumed innocent.  The Judge reasoned that the TRC260
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& Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone to Conduct a Public Hearing with Samuel Hinga
Norman, ¶ 10 (Oct. 29, 2003), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=
wZfWNvJbMvU%3d&tabid=153.
261. Id. ¶ 12. 
262. Id. ¶ 14.
263. Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2003-08-PT, Decision on Appeal by the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone (“TRC” or “The Commission”) and Chief Samuel
Hinga Norman JP Against the Decision of His Lordship, Mr. Justice Bankole Thompson Delivered
on 30 October 2003 To Deny the TRC’s Request to Hold a Public Hearing with Chief Samuel
Hinga Norman JP (Nov. 28, 2003).
264. Id. ¶ 10. The TRC-SL submitted that “playing a central part” in the conflict did not
necessitate the commission of human rights abuses and further, that the presumption of innocence
on which Judge Thompson placed so much emphasis in the Trial Decision was not a straight jacket,
“which insulates and indictee, against his wishes, from all forms of questioning prior to trial.” Id.
265. Id. ¶ 3.
266. Neil Boister, Failing to Get to the Heart of the Matter in Sierra Leone? The Truth
Commission is Denied Unrestricted Access to Chief Hinga Norman, 2. J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1100,
1104-5 (2004). 
267. Id. at 1105. 
considered Norman a perpetrator, and that this designation was
incompatible, as Norman had pleaded not guilty on all seven counts.261
Judge Thompson then decided, based on a balancing test on the
institutional and societal interest in establishing an accurate historical
record of the conflict and the due process entitlement to a fair and
public trial that the individual defendant’s right always prevailed.  262
The TRC-SL appealed this decision to the President of the SCSL;
interestingly, the SCSL sat as arbiter of a case, in which the Court was
to decide the integrity of its own proceedings.  President Geoffrey263
Robertson did not address the substantive arguments put forward in
Judge Thompson’s ruling, with its argument on the presumption of
innocence.  Instead, he noted, “It is not normally appropriate for one264
judge to review another’s exercise of discretion.”  The TRC-SL265
argued before Judge Robertson: (i) that it was not a court of law and as
such could not legally place someone in the category of “perpetrator;”
(ii) that other tribunals including the ICTY and ICTR recognized the
legitimacy of relying on other interests to restrict the right to a fair trial,
and furthermore that these interests included Norman’s right to testify,
his freedom of expression, the public interest in ensuring the fulfillment
of the TRC’s mandate and the victims right to know the truth amongst
others.  The prosecution opposed the request on the same grounds as266
before.  267
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268. Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2003-08-PT, Decision on Appeal, ¶ 30.
269. Id. 
270. Id. ¶ 31. 
271. Id. ¶ 32. He asserted that the TRC-SL had put forward no reason as to why it shifted from
an initial request for a two-day private interview which he noted may have been granted, to a
confidential interview, which he also notes may have been granted, to an application for a
“televised spectacle.” Id.
272. Evenson, supra note 22, at 758. 
273. Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2003-08-PT, Decision on Appeal, ¶ 38. 
274. Id. ¶ 40. 
275. Id. ¶ 41.
276. Id. 
Judge Robertson viewed the proposed TRC-SL hearing as, “a
spectacle.”268
A man in custody awaiting trial on very serious charges
is to be paraded, in the very court where that trial will
shortly be held, before a Bishop rather than a presiding
judge and permitted to broadcast live to the nation for a
day or so uninterrupted . . . . The event will have the
appearance of a trial, at least the appearance of a sort of
trial familiar from centuries past, although the first day
of uninterrupted testimony may resemble more a very
long political broadcast.269
Judge Robertson stated that the Nuremberg Tribunal and other tribunals
would not have allowed such “a spectacle” and that it would not be
helpful precedent to grant public testimony for other post conflict
countries.  He reasoned that there was no reason to insist upon public270
testimony,  and sought to reach a compromise solution looking at the271
mandates of both the TRC-SL and the SCSL.  Judge Robertson272
maintained that there was a way of “obtaining such sworn testimony
without endangering the integrity of the [SCSL],”  and since there273
were alternative methods for Norman to exercise his freedom of speech,
Norman could not “dictate the manner in which the [SCSL] must
effectuate it.”  As such, he concluded that Norman could provide274
testimony “in writing (with the benefit of legal advice) and sworn in the
form of an affidavit.”  According to this ruling, Norman retained the275
right to meet the TRC-SL in private and if necessary in confidence.276
The Judge deemed this solution would allow the TRC-SL to find out the
“truth,” and while the refusal of a public hearing may have impacted on
the TRC-SL’s reconciliation work, the Judge declared that
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277. Id. ¶ 42.
278. See Boister, supra note 266, at 1108. 
279. Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2003-08-PT, Decision on Appeal, ¶ 33.
280. Interviews from Sierra Leone Assessment Mission, supra note 111. See also Searching
for the Truth, supra note 224, at 5. 
281. Interview with Joseph Rahall, Executive Director of Green Scenery, in Freetown, Sierra
Leone (July 8, 2005).
282. Press Release, TRC-SL, Special Court Denies Hinga Norman’s Right (And That Of
The Other Detainees) To Appear Publicly Before the TRC, (Dec. 1, 2003) (cited in TRC-SL
REPORT, supra note 57, vol. 3B, ch. 6, at 412). 
reconciliation did not apply to a defendant who had plead not guilty.277
The TRC-SL faced with the end of its tenure on December 31, 2003,
and with a Revised Practice Direction, which in the TRC-SL’s view still
did not allow for confidential interviews, the TRC-SL did not seek to
take testimony from the detainees.278
The back and forth between the SCSL and the TRC-SL over access
to the detainees represented a failure on the part of both institutions to
recognize the unique role that each played in Sierra Leone’s transitional
justice process. The language of the Court’s decision, although clothed
in the integrity of the SCSL’s proceedings, actually assumed the
primacy of its proceedings. At one point, Judge Thompson notes while
comparing both institutions, that “criminal courts offer the most
effective remedy.”  However, many Sierra Leoneans felt that the279
SCSL had erred and erred gravely, as Norman’s testimony was essential
to the completion of the work of the TRC-SL.  One interviewee280
concluded, “the fact that the [SCSL] muzzled Hinga Norman and the
others not to speak before the [TRC-SL] means that it is only half-truth
that we know. It is not complete . . . .”  The TRC-SL affirmed that the281
ruling had 
[D]ealt a serious blow to the cause of truth and
reconciliation in Sierra Leone. As a citizen of Sierra
Leone and as a key role-player in Sierra Leone’s recent
history, Chief Hinga Norman has a right to appear before
the TRC to tell his story. . . . The decision to deny . . . his
right represents a grave and irreparable injustice, not
only to the detainee himself but also to the people of
Sierra Leone.282
While this decision may have represented one of the most contentious
decisions defining the relationship between the SCSL and the TRC-SL,
to Judge Robertson’s credit he did make an effort to outline the
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283. Trial-ch.org, Trial Watch: Samuel Hinga Norman, http://www.trial-ch.org/en/trial-
watch/profil/db/facts/samuel-hinga_norman_167.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2009). 
284. TRC-L Act, supra note 85, art. IV § 4(a). 
285. Interview with Thomas A. Bureh, supra note 157.
286. Interview with Paul Allen, supra note 83.
287. TRC-L Act, supra note 85, art. VII § 26(b), (d).
288. Id. art. VII § 26(i). 
complementary operations of both institutions, given that there were no
established guidelines. With the death of Norman before the conclusion
of his trial at the SCSL,  the characterization of the decision of the283
SCSL by the TRC-SL as an “irreparable injustice” rings even more true.
The people of Sierra Leone will never hear Norman’s story either from
his testimony before the TRC-L or through his trial before the SCSL. 
The concurrent operation of the TRC-SL and the SCSL proved to be
problematic, as no clear and concrete regulations were in place to guide
the behavior of the two institutions. The complications that these two
institutions faced while operating simultaneously ultimately affected
their ability to foster their respective mandates in Sierra Leone.
Moreover, the Norman Appeal Decision set an important, even if less
than ideal international precedent for the restriction of a truth-telling
process by a justice-seeking process. The next section discusses the
significance of the Norman Appeal Decision in light of the TRC-L’s
attempt to seek access to Taylor. 
2. The SCSL and the TRC-L: The Case of Charles Taylor
The main potential for conflict between the SCSL and the TRC-L is
over the issue of access to Taylor. The TRC-L Act mandates it to
investigate gross human rights violations, violations of international
humanitarian law and abuses that occurred during the Liberian civil
war.  Many argue that the TRC-L needs to have access to Taylor, as284
he was “the engineer of the war in Liberia.”  One interviewee285
commented, “I think the rewriting of Liberian history will be
incomplete without Charles Taylor’s version . . . . The Liberian people
will be left vague about what role he has played.”  The TRC-L’s Act286
requires it to identify those responsible for committing gross violations,
and other abuses,  and the Act mandates the TRC-L to create an287
accurate and objective account of the past.  It seems clear that access288
to Taylor will be essential for the TRC-L to carry out its mandate. 
If Taylor is not granted the opportunity to respond to allegations
regarding international crimes committed in Liberia leveled against him
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289. HAYNER, supra note 159, at 129-130 (discussing guidelines for due process); see also
Final Phase TRC-L, supra note 120, at 24-25 (discussing the right to reply and the right to the
presumption of innocence).
290. HAYNER, supra note 159, at 108.
291. Id. at 129-30.
during the TRC-L’s proceedings, this would raise important due process
considerations. In the context of truth commissions, due process
requires that individuals that are accused of crimes be given an
opportunity to defend themselves against such allegations.  However,289
a truth commission is not a court of law and does not have the ability to
determine criminal guilt or innocence. Yet regardless of this fact, as
Priscilla Hayner, Director of the Peace and Justice Program for the ICTJ
notes, “those named in a truth commission report are popularly
understood to be guilty, period; the distinction between criminal or legal
guilt and a commission’s finding of responsibility for a crime will be
lost on most readers.”  While due process requirements differ between290
truth commissions and courts, Hayner outlines the three main guidelines
that commissions should follow:
First, individuals who may be named in a report should
be informed of the allegations against them and told that
the commission intends to name them in a public report.
Second, these persons should be given the opportunity to
respond to the evidence against them and to offer a
defense, either in writing or in an appearance before the
commission, in a procedure determined by the
commission . . . . The commission should state clearly
that its own conclusions about individual responsibility
do not amount to criminal guilt, which must be left to the
courts.291
In the instant case, the SCSL’s prosecution of Taylor has essentially
prevented the TRC-L from following these principles of due process.
Numerous witnesses have testified before the TRC-L leveling
264 FLORIDA JOU RNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 21
292. See, e.g., Press Release, The TRC-L, Taylor’s al Qaeda Links . . . Global Witness Opens
Lid (Feb. 20, 2009), available at https://www.trcofliberia.org/news-1/press-releases/charles-
taylor2019s-al-qaeda-links-global-witness-opens-lid (stating that Taylor received $1 million for
arranging to harbor two al Qaeda operatives in Liberia soon after the September 11 terrorist attacks
on the United States); Press Release, The TRC-L, Taylor, Ghadafi, Ex-CIA Agent Organized Arms,
Diamonds Smuggling Company …Latvian Investigative Journalist... (Feb. 18, 2009), available at
https://www.trcofliberia.org/news-1/press-releases/taylor-ghadafi-ex-cia-agent-organized-arms-
diamonds-smuggling-company-latvian-investigative-journalist-reveals-documents; Press Release,
The TRC-L, Taylor’s Cartel Looted & Pillaged Forest Resources (Feb. 17, 2009), available at
https://www.trcofliberia.org/news-1/press-releases/taylor2019s-cartel-looted-pillaged-forest-
resources; Press Release, The TRC-L, Taylor's Fighters Massacred Hundred In Kolahun …ATU
Radio Operator Testified (Feb. 20, 2009), available at https://www.trcofliberia.org/news-1/press-
releases/taylors-fighters-massacred-hundred-in-kolahun-atu-radio-operator-testified; Press Release,
The TRC-L, President Taylor Ordered My Execution …Moses Blah Explains Ordeal, (Sept. 15,
2008), available at https://www.trcofliberia.org/news-1/press-releases/president-taylor-ordered-my-
execution-moses-blah-explains-ordeal; Press Release, The TRC-L, Taylor, Sogbandi, Musuleng-
Cooper Forced Victims to Lie to U.N. . . . Says Carter Camp Survivor, (June 12, 2008), available
at https://www.trcofliberia.org/news-1/press-releases/taylor-sogbandi-musuleng-cooper-forced-
victims-to-lie-to-un-says-carter-camp-survivor (stating that Taylor forced survivors of the Carter
Camp Massacre to attribute responsibility to the Liberian Army as opposed to the NPFL); Press
Release, The TRC-L, Lebanese Businessman Imported Arms For President Taylor, (Feb. 13, 2008),
available at https://www.trcofliberia.org/news-1/press-releases/201clebanese-businessman-
imported-arms-for-president-taylor201d; Press Release, The TRC-L, Former Deputy Public Works
Minister’s Widow Testify (Jan. 24, 2008), available at https://www.trcofliberia.org/news-1/press-
releases/former-deputy-public-works-minister2019s-widow-testify/ (stating that the widow of
former Deputy Minister of Public Works, Isaac Vaye, told the TRC-L that former president Charles
Taylor and General Benjamin Yeaten were responsible for the death of her husband).
293. Press Release, The TRC-L, Saah Gborlie Denies Allegations of Atrocities…Urges TRC
To Interview Charles Taylor & Others, (Nov. 27, 2008), available at https://www.trcofliberia.org/
news-1/press-releases/saah-gborlie-denies-allegations-of-atrocities-urges-trc-to-interview-charles-
taylor-others. 
294. TRC-L Act, supra note 85, art. VII § 26(c).
allegations against Taylor.  One witness even admonished the TRC-L292
that
The best person to be questioned if you had to invoke the
doctrine of greatest responsibility and that of the
appropriate authority of government is the head of the
group or government at that time. The TRC has a lot of
resources to visit The Hague and discuss with Mr.
Taylor.293
Indeed, the TRC-L’s Act not only requires it to identify those
responsible for committing gross violations but also to determine
whether such violations were the result of deliberate planning.  If the294
TRC-L is going to attribute responsibility to Taylor for gross abuses
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Oct. 17, 2008.
297. TRC-L Act, supra note 85, art. VII § 26(e).
298. Revised Practice Direction on Access to Detainees.
committed in Liberia based on its investigations and testimony before it,
then Taylor must be allowed to respond to such allegations should he
choose to and proffer a defense. If this does not happen, then any
finding made by the TRC-L against Taylor may lack legitimacy.
Perhaps realizing the due process implications of its proceedings, the
TRC-L issued a “last call notice,” to Taylor in a public notification to
“Perpetrators,” “Alleged Perpetrators,” and “Persons of Interest,” to
contact the TRC-L by the end of 2008.  Implicit in this citation,295
wherein, the TRC-L deemed it needed the named individuals to answer
allegations against them, was that failure to answer would result in the
Commission using its compulsory powers. However, the public citation
of Taylor is interesting, since it is clear that the TRC-L was aware of his
detention in The Hague. Courtney Griffiths, Taylor’s attorney argued
“the TRC would not succeed without Mr. Taylor’s testimony,” and that
the Liberian government should not have sent Taylor to the Hague, if it
wanted him to testify at the TRC.”  While not addressing the296
substance of this argument, it does highlight that access to Taylor,
whether confidential or public, will be essential for the TRC-L to carry
out its mandate. The next sections will examine the problems posed by
confidential access to Taylor or seeking public testimony from him. 
i. Confidential Access to Taylor
The failure to adopt a regional approach in designing transitional
justice mechanisms in Liberia and Sierra Leone, has led to the
circumstance where there is ambiguity regarding whether evidence or
testimony gathered from Taylor by the TRC-L would be confidential.
The TRC-L’s Act states that evidence gathered “through the conduct of
both public and confidential hearings,” is “subject to the exclusive
discretion and authority of the TRC.”  The SCSL’s Revised Practice297
Direction outlines the procedure following a request by a State, or
“other legitimate authority” to take a statement from a person in the
custody of the SCSL.  The Revised Practice Direction would likely298
guide requests by the TRC-L for access to Taylor, because it would
either qualify as a “legitimate authority,” or the Liberian Government
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299. Id. ¶ 4 (3). 
300. Id. ¶ 5. In the event that the detainee gives informed consent, “the request for questioning
will only be rejected if the Presiding Judge is satisfied that a refusal is necessary in the interests of
justice or to maintain the integrity of the proceedings of the Special Court.” Id. 
301. See Wierda et al., supra note 126, at 18 (discussing confessions before the TRC-SL and
suggesting that allowing indicted individuals to come before the Commission and confess and then
withholding that confession from the Special Court (because of use-immunity or other barriers)
would enable perpetrators to manipulate both institutions and may result in a miscarriage of
justice). 
302. TRC-L Act, supra note 85, art. VII § 26(m); see also id. art. VII § 26(p)(iii)(a) which
provides that when the TRC-L determines to hold a hearing in camera, “[n]o information relating
could theoretically make a request to the SCSL on the TRC-L’s behalf.
The Revised Practice Direction states, 
[T]hat a copy of the record may be made available, upon
order by the Presiding Judge, to a party or defence
counsel for potential use in proceedings before the
Special Court unless the questioning is covered, in whole
or in part, by a confidentiality order, statute, or protocol,
in which case a party or defence counsel may apply to
the appropriate chamber for an order that the record of
the questioning shall be disclosed in the interests of
justice (which may include the interests of justice with
respect to other suspects or accused before the Special
Court).299
While the Revised Practice Direction makes it somewhat harder for
either the Prosecution or the Defense to gain access to testimony or
evidence obtained by a truth commission before the SCSL, as witnessed
in the dispute between the TRC-SL and the SCSL, there is still potential
for testimony to be used in “the interests of justice,” or to “maintain the
integrity of the proceedings” before the SCSL.  300
If Taylor were to meet in confidence with the TRC-L, the Prosecutor
of the SCSL would most likely request a record of the proceedings. If
Taylor were to confess about his alleged role in the conflict in Sierra
Leone or make incriminating statements in confidence to the TRC-L,
the Prosecutor of the SCSL would presumably argue that the testimony
needs to be disclosed in the “interests of justice.”  Yet, releasing301
confidential testimony to the SCSL would undermine the statutory
powers of the TRC-L, which provides that, “the TRC shall not be
compelled by any authority to disclose any such information given to it
in confidence.”  Moreover, the TRC- L can grant use immunity for302
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to the proceedings or any part thereof held in camera shall be made public in any manner;” see also
id. art. X § 47 which provides “[t]he archives of the TRC shall remain in the public domain except
those records or documents classified by the TRC as “confidential” which shall remain classified
for 20 years following the retirement of the TRC.”
303. Id. art. VII § 30. 
The TRC shall grant immunity to all persons or groups of persons,
organizations or institutions from prosecution or tort actions on account
of statements made or evidence given before the TRC in advancement
of the public interest objective inherent in the functions and objects of
the TRC and pursuant to the successful execution of its mandate, and
which therefore, shall not be used in any court of law against the person
making the statement. 
Id.; see also Wierda et al., supra note 126, at 13 n.34 (discussing how truth commissions
often grant use immunity where witnesses may be compelled to answer questions that
may incriminate them). 
testimony before it, which would prevent the use of testimony given
before the TRC-L against that person in a criminal prosecution.  Thus,303
it would be inconsistent with the Accused’s protection from self-
incrimination and the grant of use immunity before the TRC-L to
release confidential testimony before the TRC-L, in furtherance of
Taylor’s prosecution before the SCSL. Critically, the TRC-L Act does
not specify whether the use immunity is limited to future prosecutions
occurring in Liberia, or also includes ongoing or future prosecutions
taking place elsewhere. Moreover, it is uncertain whether the SCSL
would actually respect the use immunity provided by the TRC-L. Thus,
it is unclear whether Taylor’s testimony would be confidential and
whether or not the use-immunity would have any effect. 
The Norman Appeal Decision indicates that the SCSL might be
receptive to confidential access. On the other hand, the SCSL might
find that granting the TRC-L confidential access to Taylor would be
against the “interests of justice,” or would jeopardize “the integrity of
its proceedings.” The TRC-L would be seeking access to Taylor to
investigate events occurring during the Liberian conflict, which may not
necessarily implicate the integrity of the SCSL’s proceedings or affect
the “interests of justice,” given the Court’s limited jurisdiction.
However, if the SCSL reached a contrary conclusion, there would be no
recourse for the TRC-L. The failure to adopt a regional approach in
designing the transitional justice mechanisms in Liberia and Sierra
Leone has led to this unfortunate situation.
Moreover, the confusion between the TRC-L’s Act and the Revised
Practice Direction of the SCSL regarding confidentiality and use-
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306. See supra discussion Part V (introduction discussing the time-frame for the operation of
the TRC-L scheduled to conclude in June 2009, and Taylor’s Defense set to begin in June of 2009).
307. See Stearns, supra note 116 (noting that Taylor’s lawyers indicate that he will testify in
his defense).
308. TRC-L Act, supra note 85, art. VII § 26(p) (stating that hearings are public unless “(i)(a)
It would be in the interests of justice; or (b) That there would be a likelihood that harm may ensue
to any person as a result of proceedings being open . . . ”). 
immunity creates serious disincentives for Taylor to want to testify
before the TRC-L. Indeed, Taylor has communicated to the TRC-L
through his legal representative that he does not wish to give
testimony  until he concludes his trial before the SCSL.  However,304 305
the TRC-L will likely no longer be operational at that time,  thus, the306
first time that he speaks publicly will be at his trial,  and it will not307
concern events occurring in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, but rather
only war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed in
Sierra Leone. The implications of this for the transitional justice process
in Liberia is exceedingly problematic, as the SCSL’s prosecution of
Taylor, may simultaneously result in an “irreparable injustice” to the
people of Liberia. Where massive human rights violations are not
limited to one state, and one society’s pursuit of “truth,” and another
society’s pursuit of “justice” are in conflict, it is impossible to
determine which society’s rights should be privileged. This section has
explained how the failure to adopt a regional approach has negatively
impacted the TRC-L’s ability to seek confidential access to Taylor to
further its investigations. The following section analyzes the issues
raised by holding a public hearing with Taylor.
ii. A Public Hearing
The failure to adopt a regional approach in designing transitional
justice mechanisms in Liberia and Sierra Leone has similarly resulted in
the inability of the TRC-L to hold a public hearing with Taylor. The
hearings procedure for the TRC-L allows for public hearings unless
such a proceeding would be counter to the “interests of justice” or there
is a likelihood that harm would ensue to persons because of a public
proceeding.  The hearings procedure for the TRC-L seems to be308
consistent with the SCSL’s procedure for granting access outlined in its
Revised Practice Direction and the Norman Appeal Decision.
Nevertheless, there is no indication that the TRC-L will hold a public
hearing with Taylor. The Chairman has stated that unlike the TRC-SL,
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309. Interview with Jerome Verdier, supra note 1. 
310. Notably, numerous criminal cases allow media coverage in different jurisdictions, without
such coverage damaging the “integrity of the proceedings.” Of course, where a court is dealing with
highly sensitive information it will often place a ban on media coverage. 
311. See Boister, supra note 266, at 1116 (commenting on how when Judge Robertson
considers the reality of the TRC process, “he does not appear to like what he sees”).
312. See supra discussion Part IV(2)(ii) (discussing the Velasquez Rodriguez case and the
Study on the Right to Truth, which reflects the principle that where there is no opportunity for
judicial action against the alleged perpetrators of the crime, the “right to truth” becomes even more
I do not imagine this TRC would request that Charles
Taylor return to Liberia to face a public process . . . . But
there should be other creative means of granting access
to Charles Taylor. . .  309
Indeed, a public hearing is impractical for a number of reasons. Most
importantly, being the unwillingness of Taylor to participate in such a
proceeding because of the reasons discussed above. There are also a
host of other limitations, including the TRC-L lacking the requisite time
and funding to conduct a public hearing in The Hague. Further, the ICC
may not be willing to let the TRC-L use its facilities for this purpose. 
Moreover, even if the TRC-L determined that a public hearing
would be consistent with its hearing procedures, and Taylor agreed to
participate in a public hearing before the TRC-L, the SCSL could rebuff
the application. Significantly, if the TRC-L made a determination that a
public hearing would not run counter to the “interests of justice” and
that there was little likelihood of harm to persons because of a public
proceeding in accordance with its own procedures, such a finding would
not be enough. The SCSL would have to reach its own independent
determination. The SCSL could be persuaded by arguments regarding
the adverse influence of witnesses, and the possibility of public hearings
involving Taylor upsetting the fragile peace in the sub-region, since, the
SCSL relocated his trial due to security concerns. Further, the SCSL
may regard an application by the TRC-L as inviting a “spectacle.”310
Yet, as Neil Boister, Associate Professor at the University of
Canterbury School of Law, who’s research focuses on international
criminal law and interstate penal cooperation, correctly notes the
SCSL’s antipathy towards a public hearing of a truth commission,311
alone would not suffice to deny the people of both Sierra Leone and
Liberia’s “right to truth” from one of the key architects of the regional
conflict. The “right to truth” is even more significant for Liberia
because there is currently no opportunity for judicial action against
Taylor for the alleged international crimes committed in Liberia.312
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314. See Boister, supra note 266, at 1111.
315. Id. at 1116-17 (discussing reasons the Norman Appeal Decision is not persuasive as
precedent in other contexts). 
316. Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2003-08-PT, Decision on Appeal by the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone (“TRC” or “The Commission”) and Chief Samuel
Hinga Norman JP Against the Decision of His Lordship, Mr. Justice Bankole Thompson Delivered
on 30 October 2003 To Deny the TRC’s Request to Hold a Public Hearing with Chief Samuel
Hinga Norman JP, ¶ 33 (Nov. 28, 2003).
Furthermore, The Study on the Right to Truth found that the right is a
“stand-alone right,” which “should not be subject to limitations.”313
Professor Boister recommends that the SCSL should have engaged
in a balancing test to determine whether the SCSL’s decision to ban a
public hearing had a disproportionate impact on “Norman’s right to
speak and the Sierra Leonean’s public’s right to hear.”  Boister is314
essentially arguing for a balancing of the “interests of justice” against
the “right to truth.” Nevertheless, how would such a balancing test
apply in the case of the TRC-L and the SCSL? As noted earlier, where
massive human rights violations have been committed in multiple
societies, it is incredibly difficult to determine which society’s rights
and interests should be determinative. If the SCSL engaged in a
balancing test to determine whether a ban on a public hearing because
of the “interests of justice,” would have a disproportionate impact on
the public’s “right to truth,” the SCSL may regard the Norman Appeal
Decision as persuasive.  The Court’s decision in that case was based315
on the perceived supremacy of international criminal justice over and
above a process of truth-telling.  The SCSL could ostensibly reach a316
similar conclusion regarding Taylor. Yet, it is not evident that
international or hybrid courts must always have priority over national
truth commissions. This is particularly so, where massive human rights
violations are not limited to one State but affect other States, and one
society’s pursuit of “truth,” and the other society’s pursuit of “justice”
are in conflict. The TRC-L’s investigation of gross violations of human
rights law and international humanitarian law occurring in Liberia in the
context of a public hearing with Taylor may not run counter to the
“interests of justice” or undermine the “integrity” of the SCSL’s
proceedings, since the SCSL does not have the jurisdiction to
investigate crimes occurring outside of Sierra Leone. 
However, if the SCSL held the contrary, there would be little to no
recourse for the TRC-L. The SCSL has the power to hold suspects
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317. See SCSL Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 216, R. 33(c) (empowering the
Registrar to adopt and amend rules governing the detention of persons awaiting trial subject to the
approval of a Council of Judges); Id. R. 40bis (transfer and provisional detention of suspects); see
also SCSL Ratification Act, supra note 125, §§ 25-29 (concerning the delivery of persons arrested
into the custody of the SCSL).
318. TRC-L Act, supra note 85, art. VII § 27(d). The TRC-L can, “[c]ompel attendance of any
person before the TRC or any of its staff for the purpose of assisting the TRC in the conduct of its
work and may publish a warrant, subpoena, or citation after diligent efforts have been exhausted
to no avail in making a personal service .” Id. 
awaiting trial in custody and to regulate access to these detainees;  yet,317
the TRC-L is empowered to compel attendance at its hearings.  The318
TRC-L could hypothetically “compel” Taylor’s attendance, but such an
action would have little practical effect given that the SCSL has Taylor
in its custody. The failure to adopt a regional approach in designing the
transitional justice mechanisms in Liberia and Sierra Leone has lead to
the regrettable situation of having a tribunal situated in one country
inhibiting the truth-telling process in another, and has limited the
potential impact of both institutions. Based on the challenges
enumerated above, the following Part discusses recommendations that
address the issues raised by the failure to adopt a regional approach. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The purpose of this Part is to provide broader guidance for the
creation of transitional institutions set up to address regional conflict
complexes. The issues raised in the case study regarding legal primacy,
information sharing, and access to detainees demonstrate the
importance of truth commissions and international/hybrid courts
coordinating their operations generally. However, they also demonstrate
that coordination does not suffice, and is a second best option where
massive human rights violations have occurred across States, hence the
need for a regional approach. Indeed, for coordination to work, both
institutions would have to determine that cooperation on the above
issues would not impinge on the institution’s ability to carry out its own
mandate. That is each institution would have to come to an independent
determination that cooperation with the other institution would result in
a positive net gain. While possibilities for coordination and cooperation
between truth commissions and trials might exist at a national level,
such cooperation and coordination is bound to be limited given the
inherent conflicts in the roles and mandates of each institution.
Moreover, possibilities for coordination and cooperation are even
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Preliminary Exploration, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 729, 733 (2003).
further constrained at a regional or transnational level, where the
mechanisms have been created without regard to the regional or
transnational nature of abuses. In order to ensure against the haphazard
operation of transitional justice mechanisms where they have been
designed without regard to conflict lines, it is wholly inadequate to
place the onus on the institutions to cooperate and coordinate their
operations. 
Indeed, when it comes to mass atrocity, “it must be recognized that
the total is clearly more than the sum of the parts, and no useful purpose
is served by breaking up an overall pattern of systemic criminality into
select instances of that criminality.”  This is exactly the circumstance319
created by the SCSL’s prosecution of Taylor for crimes allegedly
committed in the territory of Sierra Leone. In such cases, only a
regional approach to transitional justice mechanisms “can do justice to
the transnational complexity of events that have many dimensions to
them.”  A regional approach is useful where regional conflict320
complexes exist, because regional conflict complexes span territories
with different sovereigns. A regional approach recognizes the
interconnectedness of conflicts and does not arbitrarily create
institutions with mandates, which ignore regional dynamics. A regional
approach makes sense where massive violations have occurred across
States because, “while international crimes are of concern to the entire
international community, the peace and security implications of such
crimes are often greatest within the region where the crimes occur.”321
At a maximum, one could envision the creation of a regional
transitional justice mechanism. This body could be a regional court or
truth commission and serve as a complement or substitute to national
transitional justice mechanisms depending on the will of affected
communities. The victims in the affected communities would have to
determine which regional transitional justice mechanism they want to
utilize to address the legacy of conflict in the region. Participation from
civil society groups in each country, and consultations with
governmental actors, regional and international organizations as well as
other key stakeholders should inform this process. As there will
undoubtedly be competing demands about what approach to take,
whatever institution adopted should be chosen based on consensus as
much as possible, but victims’ desires should be prioritized as their
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participation is imperative to the success of any regional transitional
justice mechanism. Furthermore, broad notions of standing should be
invoked in any mechanism, which will allow for the participation of
victims, organizations, or States, who can demonstrate that they have a
legitimate interest in the proceedings. 
The normative appeal of taking a regional approach to creating
transitional justice mechanisms in the aftermath of mass atrocity
affecting multiple societies should be apparent. A regional approach
will avoid instances where one society’s pursuit of “truth” and another’s
of “justice” comes into conflict. It will similarly limit the difficulties of
determining competing claims to the “duty to prosecute,” or the “right
to truth,” and trying to balance one society’s rights and interests over
another, as well as balancing victims’ rights, by attempting to
adjudicate, which society “has the most valid claim in any one case.”322
A regional body would circumvent situations where several States have
a keen interest in exercising jurisdiction, and where one State’s exercise
of jurisdiction, inevitably frustrates the aspiration of the other State(s). 
A regional transitional justice mechanism’s mandate or jurisdiction
would be based on the reality of the conflict lines, both territorially and
temporally. Significantly, this means that the founding documents of the
commission would enable it to investigate, or the court to investigate
and prosecute crimes occurring in all affected States. Investigations and
prosecutions would examine all aspects of criminality including the
transnational nature of abuses, and not arbitrarily focus on one select
instance, limiting the problems posed by lop-sided prosecutions and
investigations. A regional approach would also deal with double
jeopardy concerns raised by the possibility of multiple prosecutions
from different States. Thus, a regional body would presumably fulfill
the interests of all affected States in seeking “truth” or “justice.” 
Significantly, a regional approach would avoid several of the
challenges posed in the case of Liberia and Sierra Leone where massive
human rights violations have occurred across States. A regional
transitional justice mechanism would address decisively matters of legal
primacy in its founding documents. A regional body would also
articulate the procedures for information collected through its
investigations and whether or not such information is to be shared with
national or international institutions. A regional mechanism would
establish clear guidelines at the outset in the event that information is to
be shared, which will help to circumvent potential problems with
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confidentiality and use immunity of testimony. Moreover, a regional
body would prevent disputes over access to detainees, since it would be
designed in a comprehensive fashion, which takes into account the
“right to truth,” for victims, their families, and societies. A regional
transitional justice mechanism would protect due process and facilitate
“the right to reply” of individuals who have had allegations leveled
against them. 
A regional approach is also appealing for a number of practical
reasons. The physical proximity of the regional transitional justice
mechanism will ensure that affected communities can more readily
access the proceedings before the regional court or commission. The
“perceived legitimacy of the” transitional justice mechanism “turns on
the connection of the proceedings to those most affected by the crimes
being”  investigated. A regional court or truth commission would323
likely draw on lawyers, judges, and other personnel from the region in
order to ensure that the composition of both bodies reflects that of the
region. The regional transitional justice mechanism could of course
have international staff, but the emphasis should be on employing
qualified personnel from the region. This would grant the regional
transitional justice mechanism more legitimacy with local populations,
because it would be less likely to be perceived as a “foreign” institution
imposing its will. A regional body with staff from the region might also
be “perceived as more responsive to local customs, values, and
preferences,”  which will help the institution to maintain its324
credibility. 
A regional transitional justice mechanism would also be more cost
effective because it would be able to draw resources from a number of
countries, which will allow it to achieve greater results than national
mechanisms which are often cash strapped, and yet not have the cost be
prohibitive to its establishment as with ad hoc international tribunals. A
regional body would also be efficient because it could negate the
necessity of multiple commissions or prosecutions. Similarly, a regional
mechanism means that judges and lawyers can be drawn from within
the entire region, as opposed to being limited to the weakened and
tainted judiciary and legal system of a post-conflict country. Lastly, a
regional transitional justice mechanism is also more likely to be
shielded from domestic political pressures. 
Notwithstanding the potential benefits of a regional transitional
justice mechanism, it might be difficult to implement in practice
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Id. art. 3. 
328. See Peace Versus Justice, supra note 109, at 36-37 (discussing common criticisms against
the ICC, including the fact that despite the over 1,700 requests for investigations, the only ones
pursued have been in Africa. Citing concerns that have been raised that the Court’s exercise of its
jurisdiction has contributed to “neo-imperialism,” and exacerbated the unequal power relations
between the North and the Continent. Noting how there is also the perception that the ICC effects
“selective justice” ignoring blatant human rights violations perpetrated by powerful nations like the
U.S. in Iraq, and only focusing its investigations on poorer and weaker states in Africa. Mentioning
the perception that the Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction ignores or devalues traditional methods
because it would require consensus from both victims and States that
may have competing demands. Additionally, States within the “regional
conflict complex” would need to conclude a treaty or similar agreement
to establish such a body. However, “many parts of the world already
have strong regional mechanisms in place, within which regional
criminal courts”  or truth commissions could be situated. Such325
institutions could become a part of the Inter-American, European, or
African human rights systems or of sub-regional bodies. In addition,
many regions take a regional approach to conflict prevention and
maintenance of international peace and security, therefore, a regional
approach to post-conflict reconstruction efforts like transitional justice
mechanisms might be readily accepted. For example, in West Africa,
ECOWAS has been particularly instrumental in conflict prevention and
maintenance of international peace and security in the region.
Regional transitional justice mechanisms might be criticized as
duplicative given the existence of the ICC. However, the principle of
complementarity means that the ICC exercises its jurisdiction when
States are “unwilling or unable” to exercise jurisdiction.  The326
existence of a competent regional court may mean that States in the
region are willing and able to exercise their jurisdiction over
international crimes. In addition, the creation of regional transitional
justice mechanisms may allow the ICC to concentrate its attention on
the most severe international situations, allowing it to dedicate its
limited resources and staff most effectively. Moreover, given the
analysis above, regional action might be preferable to international
action,  particularly in situations where massive violations have taken327
place across societies in a region. This is particularly so in Africa,
where the ICC’s prosecutions have been subject to mounting
criticism.  Furthermore, the ICC’s jurisdiction is limited temporally,328 329
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a regional transitional justice mechanism maybe set up to prosecute or
investigate historical abuses and would not face the temporal limitations
that the ICC does. 
Additionally, a region might determine to undergo a process of
truth-telling to establish a comprehensive and accurate historical record
of a regional conflict, which is not within the statutory powers or
competence of the ICC. A regional truth commission can help to
establish an authoritative history of the involvement of regional leaders
in violence in the region, since the reality is that many of the findings of
a national truth commission will be contested. Further, a regional
commission with participation from relevant countries will help to
ensure more “buy in” and implementation of recommendations aimed at
regional actors, then recommendations from a national body.
A regional truth commission might have proven useful in the
southern African region. The South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission is almost universally heralded as a success.  However,330
the truth-telling process in South Africa never reached substantially
beyond its borders to engage with South Africa’s illegal occupation of
Namibia, its invasion in Angola and the sponsoring of surrogate rebel
movements in both Mozambique and Angola.  While the countries in331
Southern Africa had unique reasons for their respective conflicts,
through invasion, occupation, cross-border raids, sponsorship of rebel
groups and destabilization of civil society, and as the base for South
African liberation movements, each of these societies was intimately
connected to the impacts of repression and resistance during apartheid
South Africa.  South African military and political involvement in a332
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334. INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO: SELECTED
DEVELOPMENTS IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2004), available at http://www.ictj.org/images/
content/1/1/117.pdf; see About the ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY (last visited
Mar. 17, 2009).
335. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. Doc. S/25704 at 36, annex (1993) and S/25704/Add.1 (1993), adopted
by Security Council on 25 May 1993, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
336. See Wojcik et al., supra note 69, at 291.
number of the Southern African countries during the apartheid regime
remains an important issue that has not been adequately examined or
addressed.  A regional truth commission may have proven useful in333
this instance to investigate any gross violations committed and to
establish a comprehensive history for the region. 
Some have also recognized the need to create a regional truth
commission in the Former Yugoslavia:
 
Given the multiplicity of states in the former Yugoslavia
and the cross-border nature of the conflicts, many human
rights groups in Serbia and elsewhere have long
recognized the need for a regional body to investigate
and document wartime atrocities. The reality is that
many of the findings of any national truth commission [if
one were to be created]—whether in Serbia and
Montenegro, Croatia . . . would be contested in
neighboring countries. If a truth-seeking effort is to
succeed, it will likely have to be regional in composition
and operation.334
The creation in 1993 by the United Nations of the ICTY, an ad hoc
court responsible for trying high-ranking perpetrators of war crimes in
the Former Yugoslavia,  is a prime example of an institution designed335
to address a regional conflict in modern times. However, this effort was
driven mostly by international actors and has not seemed to completely
satisfy public or victim expectations for justice and acknowledgment,
partially because the remoteness of the tribunal from the affected
communities, has not allowed victims to be more connected to the
prosecutions of the Accused.336
A prime example of where a regional court might have been useful
was during the prosecution of Saddam Hussein before the Iraqi High
Tribunal. The trial itself had serious administrative, procedural, and
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341. For example, in Uganda, President Museveni invited the ICC to investigate the Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA). In July 2005, the ICC issued warrants for the arrest of the top five LRA
leaders for crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Some involved with the peace talks are
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substantive legal defects, which resulted in the failure to meet essential
fair trial standards, such that the credibility of the trial process itself is
doubtful.  However, I raise the trial here to illustrate how a regional337
approach might have proven beneficial. Saddam allegedly committed
crimes against Iran in 1980 and during the invasion of Kuwait.  As338
one scholar noted, 
A trial in Iraq means, first, that these other states will
in all likelihood never get to try him, and, second, that
these crimes are likely to be given comparatively short
shrift . . . . Even if these crimes had been included,
however, it is difficult not to see how a domestic Iraqi
court would have been an exceedingly odd place to try
them, and how the outcome might not have been heavily
tilted towards an Iraqi understanding of these events,
even if principles of judicial impartiality and
independence had been respected.339
Although the invasion of Kuwait was included in the Tribunal’s
jurisdiction, it was never adjudicated because Saddam was executed
after the conclusion of the Dujail trial.  A regional tribunal with340
jurisdiction to try alleged crimes committed in Kuwait, as well as Iran
and Iraq might have ensured that these alleged crimes were investigated
and prosecuted and did not receive “short shrift.”
The increasing trend of using an international criminal justice
process to address individual criminal responsibility after mass atrocity
and the creation of truth commissions to address the legacy of the past
in a transitioning society indicate that the experience of Liberia and
Sierra Leone will not be an isolated instance.  A contemporary341
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example where a regional approach might be useful in adequately
addressing the nature of the conflict is the Great Lakes region.  Indeed,342
the ICC’s prosecution of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo a former vice
president and warlord from the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC),  for allegedly committing war crimes and crimes against343
humanity in the neighboring Central African Republic,  may similarly344
limit the transitional justice options in the DRC.  As demonstrated345
above, nothing is to be gained from prosecuting select instances of
criminality. Indeed, further attention needs to be paid to developing
diverse conceptions of legal standing at the international level, which
will allow victim participation from affected societies, such as human
rights victims from the DRC, whose interest in Gombo’s prosecution
might be negatively impacted by the failure to adopt a regional
approach. 
The above analysis illustrates both the need for a regional approach
and the applicability of this approach to regional conflicts and instances
where massive human rights violations have taken place across borders.
This Article does not call for the exclusive adoption of a regional
approach in all circumstances. Rather, this Article has highlighted the
situations where a regional approach would be both appropriate and
necessary. The main challenge in adopting a regional approach to
designing transitional justice mechanisms will be making sure to
recognize the special characteristics of each country’s conflict and
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history, while also dealing with the cumulative effect of the regional
conflict. More research is needed on how a regional transitional justice
mechanism would function in practice to address this concern. This Part
has outlined some of the potential benefits of adopting a regional
approach. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
While post-conflict transitional justice mechanisms have
traditionally been set up to address legacies of abuse in one nation, this
does not reflect the reality of some conflicts and the interconnectedness
of some conflicts. This Article found that “justice” in Sierra Leone is
not unrelated to “truth” in Liberia. Analyzing challenges posed by the
concurrent operation of the TRC-L and the SCSL, has demonstrated that
where transitional justice mechanisms have been established without
regard to the regional or transnational nature of human rights violations,
such mechanisms may encounter problems regarding legal primacy,
information sharing, and access to detainees. While this Article has
focused on the experiences of Liberia and Sierra Leone, its
recommendations are not limited to this case study. The need for a
regional approach to designing transitional justice mechanisms is
apparent where massive human rights violations have occurred across
nations. A regional framework assists both practitioners and scholars in
thinking about how transitional justice mechanisms should be designed
in future situations. 
Overlapping mandates and potential conflicts between transitional
justice mechanisms, present more than just problems of coordination
because the delicate balancing act that transitional justice mechanisms
must employ ordinarily, when dealing with events concerning the
reconstruction of one society, becomes amplified where such
mechanisms impact the lives of the aggrieved, their families, and the
potential transformation of multiple societies. Thus, transitional justice
mechanisms can simply not afford to be designed without regard to the
regional nature of the conflict, or the fact that massive human rights
violations took place across borders, as this could lead to an “irreparable
injustice,” for individuals and societies that are already vulnerable. In
these instances, a regional approach to transitional justice is more likely
to achieve the goals of long-term peace, stability, and respect for human
rights within the region, then a process, which ignores the transnational
nature of abuses. 
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